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Abstract 
This paper shows how interbank asymmetry of information 
on borrower creditworthiness influences the roles played by 
lenders, credit information registries (CIRs) and regulators in 
credit markets. We stress the importance of relationship banking 
as a source of information in an environment of poor accounting 
and widespread tax evasion and discuss how this causes the 
segmentation of the credit market, making CIRs concentrate on 
providing black information and limiting the scope of prudential 
regulation. Furthermore, we show that the main traits of market 
segmentation are relatively robust to changes in interest rates 
and the cost to outsiders of assessing borrower quality. 
Resumo 
Este artigo mostra como a distribuicao assimetrica de 
informacao sobre a qualidade dos devedores influencia o papel de 
credores, bureaus de informacao de credito (CIRs) e reguladores 
no mercado de credito. N6s realcamos a imporCancia do relaciona-
mento bancario como fonte de informacao em urn ambiente mar-
cado por praticas contabeis pouco transparentes e ampla evasao 
fiscal e discutimos como isso leva a segmentacao do mercado de 
credito, fazendo corn que os CIRs se concentrem em prover infor-
macao negativa e limitando o escopo da regulacao prudential. 
Alem disso, nos mostramos que as principais caracteristicas da 
segmentacao do mercado sao relativamente robustas a mudancas 
na taxa de juros e no custo, para outros participantes, de avaliar 
a qualidade do devedor. 
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1. Introduction 
Until 1994, when inflation was brought down from the 
sky-high levels that had prevailed since the mid-seventies, the 
financial system in Brazil was almost entirely geared towards 
maximizing float income, which answered for close to half of the 
overall earnings of commercial banks. In that environment, being 
efficient in processing transactions, such as the payment of bills 
and checks, was paramount to banks, whereas credit granting 
activities received much less attention, since very little credit 
flowed to the private sector anyway.' Incentives for investing in 
proper credit analysis were further weakened by the fact that most 
medium- and long-term credit to firms and households was 
provided by state banks, funded by specific taxes and government 
transfers. And political interference, soft budgets and other dis-
tortions common to state-owned enterprises made the quality of 
credit analysis in those institutions particularly low [McKinsey 
(1998)]. Private banks, in turn, not only lent very little, but also 
concentrated their loan activities on short-term operations, such 
as overdraft facilities and working capital finance, for which 
borrowers' cash flows, managed by the same institution, worked 
as collateral. Entry deregulation in the late eighties, although 
expanding the number of banks, did little to change this scenario. 
The dramatic reduction in inflation rates after the Real 
Plan produced many changes in the financial system. In particu-
lar, it reduced banks' float income, causing some of them to run 
into serious solvency problems. This was the case of most com-
mercial state banks, and also of many small and some large 
private ones. Some of the small banks were liquidated, while most 
of the medium and large banks were resolved through purchase-
and-assumption transactions, with the government assuming a 
large share of their bad loans. 2 In the case of Banco do Brasil, the 
country's second largest bank, the government had to make a 
capital infusion of close to US$ 8 billion to avoid bankruptcy. 
Other state banks were re-capitalized and then privatized. Several 
of the banks resolved in this period were acquired by foreign 
institutions. 
One could expect that the loss of float income, a more 
stable macroeconomic environment and the entry of foreign 
institutions, which command modern credit analysis technology, 
would lead to a substantial expansion in credit activities. Surpris-
ingly, though, this did not occur, with the overall amount of credit 
1 In 1980-91. the volume credit to the private sector in Brazil averaged 27 percent of GDP, against 
ratios several times larger in industrialized and Asian developing countries [Demirguc-Kunt and 
Makismovic (1996)]. 
2 Since the Real Plan, 104 banks were resolved by different means: 42 were liquidated, 7 were 
incorporated in other institutions, 10 were transformed into non-financial institutions, 11 changed 
from universal banks to specialized financial institutions, and 34 went through purchase and 
assumption transactions. 
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extended to the private sector actually decreasing as a ratio of 
GDP [Pinheiro and Cabral (1998)1. The only segment of the credit 
market that showed a significant expansion was that of consumer 
and personal loans, which almost trebled as a proportion of GDP 
from 1993 to 1997. Banks were not prepared for this, with the 
boom in credit supply occurring with essentially no change in 
credit-granting practices, which continued to rely on old-fash-
ioned methods for selecting borrowers. Other creditors, such as 
department stores and small retailers, were in even worse situ-
ation, since they lacked even this limited experience. 
Not surprisingly, then, default rates increased dramati-
cally in this market segment, causing the bankruptcy of creditors 
that just a few months before were posting record sales and 
interest income. This was the case of two of the country's largest 
department stores, Arapud and Mesbla. Banks were not immune 
either. Public, national private and foreign banks all experienced 
a surge in default rates in their loans to households. Boavista, 
one of Brazil's most traditional banks, went bankrupt a year after 
posting the industry's highest profit rate, which was almost 
entirely based on interest income due on loans to consumers. 
Lenders were unprepared to use the available information 
to select good borrowers, but the quality and nature of that 
information may also be blamed for those poor results. Credit 
Information Registries (CIRs) have existed in Brazil for several 
decades, but have traditionally maintained mostly black informa-
tion, obtained from judicial and security registries, chambers of 
commerce and the Central Bank's registry on returned checks. 
Since after the Real Plan many borrowers were accessing credit 
markets for the first time, the information available in those CIRs 
provided little guidance about the likelihood of borrowers' default. 
In addition, to some extent the function of CIRs was less to inform 
creditors than to encourage borrowers to pay, since a bad debtor's 
name is erased from those registries once payment is done. That 
is, the emphasis was on enforcement, rather than on building 
data banks on borrower's payment history. 
It is possible then to summarize the situation in Brazil's 
credit market in the immediate aftermath of the Real Plan as one 
in which bank supervision and prudential regulation had not 
been able to prevent the failure of a large number of financial 
institutions, banks had little expertise in providing credit and 
CIRs were ill equipped to provide the information necessary for 
adequate credit risk analysis. In sum, not an environment con-
ducive to the sort of expansion in private sector credit that could 
help to accelerate economic growth. 3 
3 For evidence on the positive impact of financial deepening on economic growth, see King and Levine 
(1993) and Beck, Levine and Loayza (1999). 
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Brazil's credit market has changed since then, with banks 
investing in improving their credit analysis, a renewed dynamism 
in the CIR industry and a substantial upgrade in the quality of 
bank regulation. The decline in real interest rates and in reserve 
requirements since the 1999 devaluation of the real have also 
contributed to stimulate credit activities. But, as we argue in this 
paper, one feature of Brazil's credit market should not change in 
the foreseeable future: its segmentation into different submar-
kets, with borrowers who pose equal risk to banks facing different 
loan conditions, depending on their size and the nature of their 
banking relationships. Segmentation, in turn, will limit the scope 
of CIR activities, which should continue to concentrate on collect-
ing and disseminating black information, largely with enforce-
ment purposes. Further improvements in bank regulation should 
then take into account that a large share of the information 
necessary to assess credit risk will remain private to individual 
banks. 
Taking the Brazilian case as an example, this paper ana-
lyzes the consequences of interbank asymmetry of information 
for the way credit markets operate and, in particular, for the role 
played by CIRs in disseminating information. We argue that poor 
accounting and widespread tax evasion cause relationship bank-
ing to be a key source of information about a wide spectrum of 
borrowers, making much of the relevant information about credit-
worthiness private to individual banks. In this environment, 
credit markets tend to fragment into segments with different 
characteristics regarding interest rates and average loan size. The 
more pervasive is tax evasion and the more opaque is publicly 
available information, the larger the share of credit channeled 
through non-competitive market segments, where banks exploit 
their information monopoly to extract rents from borrowers, 
charging interest rates above those which would prevail in the 
presence of symmetric information. We show that in such a 
segmented credit market the role of private CIRs is limited 
essentially to supplying black information about borrowers, the 
main objective of which is to foster debt repayment. Although the 
analysis is centered on the Brazilian case, we believe that our 
results are also relevant for other developing countries. 
We proceed in three steps. In Section 2 we focus on the use 
of credit information by banks in their loan operations, showing 
how interbank asymmetry of information resulting from relation-
ship banking causes market segmentation. In Section 3 we argue 
that market segmentation helps to explain why CIRs in Brazil 
tend to collect and supply mostly black information, and explain 
why this situation is unlikely to change even if better mechanisms 
to screen borrower type become available. In Section 4 we look at 
how market segmentation affects supervision and prudential 
regulation of the banking sector. A final section sums up our main 
conclusions and the policy implications of our analysis. 
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2. Bank Lending to Private Parties in Brazil 
2.1. The Credit Decision Process 
Up to 1994, private Brazilian banks were not very active 
in lending and therefore were not careful in implementing credit 
decision policies and processes. In the high inflation period, from 
1974 to June 1994, with full indexation of wages, rents, contracts, 
foreign exchange and financial assets, monetary policy was gen-
erally aimed at controlling the nominal interest rate, therefore 
providing liquidity to sustain increasing levels of aggregate de-
mand. Default ratios by both firms and individuals were low, 
changes in loan-loss reserves were a small share of banks' total 
expenditures, and credit income answered for an equally small 
fraction of their overall revenue. Under those circumstances, 
credit policies were almost non-existent, being limited to main-
taining internal customers' files (cadastros) to store particularly 
negative information. Banks exchanged information about their 
customers with other lenders (both banks and non-banks) 
through a completely informal network of informers (the so-called 
informantes) whose sole function was to crosscheck restrictive 
data about the bank's borrowers. 
It was only after price stability in 1994 that financial 
institutions became keen on expanding their lending operations, 
particularly in financing the sale of durable consumer goods. In 
fact, there was an incipient credit bubble beginning with the 
stabilization plan in July 1994 and lasting up to March 1995. 
Expenses and income associated with credit activities began to 
account for a significant proportion of total bank expenditures 
and revenues. However, both banks and borrowers were not 
prepared to operate in the new environment of easy access to 
credit. The default ratio on bank loans increased faster than total 
performing loans during this period, which is, among other 
factors, an indication of the generally poor quality of credit 
management then prevailing in the country. In January 1995, on 
average, for each real of performing loans banks posted R$ 0.08 
of non-performing loans; in January 1997, the corresponding 
figure was R$ 0.18, that is, a 125% increase. This unsuccessful 
experience prompted many banks to restructure their credit 
areas, trying to introduce new policies and procedures to cope 
with credit risk. 
Six years after the burst of this credit bubble, there are still 
substantial cross-bank differences with respect to the stage of 
their organizational development, as far as the formulation, im-
plementation, monitoring, controlling and evaluation of credit 
policies, procedures and practices. On the one hand, there are 
some banks with a relatively strong credit culture, which tend to 
make intensive use of internally generated information as well as 
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external data (that is to say, mainly data provided by the various 
CIRs) as inputs to their credit decision process. On the other 
hand, banks with a loose or ill-formulated credit policy in most 
cases do not make use of formal criteria to allocate credit (other 
than the traditional method of establishing fixed credit limits to 
customers) and therefore use information less intensively, includ-
ing CIR data, to decide on lending operations. In between these 
two types, and this might be the case of most banks, there are 
many institutions trying to introduce formal policies, procedures 
and practices of credit management, including purchase of for-
eign methods and models of credit analysis and scoring. 
Procedures adopted in the credit decision process differ 
according to the type of bank and the characteristics of the 
loan/borrower. For loans to consumers and to small business, 
the general trend is towards the introduction of a highly decen-
tralized process of credit management. According to this, all loan 
requests are treated automatically by statistical methods (credit 
scoring, for instance), based on information supplied by the client 
and/or available from public records, with a decision being 
rapidly reached at the branch level. Taking into consideration the 
borrower's characteristics, the statistical model assigns him/her 
a quantity of points and the corresponding automatic credit limit. 
Exceptions are dealt with at higher levels of the credit bureauc-
racy, generally by credit committees. This asset allocation process 
is mostly used in lending operations such as overdraft facilities, 
consumer installment credit, leasing, credit-card loans and se-
cured or unsecured personal loans. That seems to be the most 
efficient way to guarantee speedy decisions in large retail banks, 
which can receive as much as 2000 loan applications per day. 4 
 For loans to small business, typically for working capital needs 
(based on discounting of predated checks and duplicatas), the 
decision process is very similar, with branches having their own 
credit limits for secured operations. 5 This means that a large 
share of all loans, as much as 80% in some banks, is decided at 
the branch level, based on automatic credit evaluation methods 
relying on statistical analysis. 
For loans other than to the so-called retail market - i.e., 
consumers and small businesses - the traditional method of 
credit management is to establish credit limits per customer in 
order to restrain the lender's exposure to a particular obligor. A 
recent trend in the banking industry has been to transform the 
credit decision into a group decision, that is to say, a decision 
made by formal credit committees which are generally organized 
according to criteria such as the value of the loan, the existence 
4 In fact, in this type of retail operation banks compete with each other with respect to the speed at 
which they can decide on loan applications, with speed in this case being measured in number of 
seconds. 
5 Given the precarious quality of accounting and other financial information on small businesses. 
where the firms' and the owners' banking accounts often mix together, lenders tend to consider them 
as a single entity for credit granting purposes. 
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and kind of collateral. and the type of operation. Each application 
is treated on a case-by-case basis by the corresponding credit 
committee, taking into consideration variables such as the cli-
ent's file (cadastro), its economic and financial situation, its 
relationship with the bank, its business tradition and its indus-
try's prospects. In some large banks, branches do not extend 
business loans (except to the small businesses mentioned earlier), 
with loan applications being decided by these committees or by 
the bank's credit department. Some small wholesale banks with 
relatively large loan values per business customer have rather 
formalized rules for the credit committees' organization, including 
variables such as its composition, size of exposure, maximum and 
minimum loan maturity, types of collateral, rules for functioning 
and also for voting on loan requests. 
Our interviews with bank managers revealed substantial 
differences with respect to the intensity with which financial 
institutions resort to CIR data - both black and white (see Annex 
A). As a general rule, it can be said that all banks use negative 
information provided by CIRs as a first filter in the credit deci-
sion-making process, that is to say, in order to decide whether or 
not to continue with the analysis of the credit application. There-
fore, that type of information is the relevant barrier to discrimi-
nate between potential borrowers and applicants with no access 
to credit markets. 6 In the retail market, where a large number of 
low-value loans to small businesses and individuals take place, 
the discriminating variable is the borrowers' credit records 
(cadastro), which is heavily biased towards weighing the impor-
tance of restrictive information. In this case, black information 
provided by CIRs is probably the most relevant and possibly the 
only data used in the credit decision process.' 
Once a credit relationship has been established, informa-
tion provided by CIRs becomes useful also for monitoring the 
borrower's financial situation, i.e., to learn about the occurrence 
of events that might lead to default. In this way, both upgrades 
and downgrades in the borrower's creditworthiness can be antici-
pated by monitoring changes in his/her economic fortunes as 
recorded in those registries. This is not a trivial consideration, 
given that in the eighties and nineties the Brazilian economy has 
been subjected to severe macroeconomic shocks, which deeply 
6 Of course, the larger the geographical coverage of the CIR databases the better the quality of the 
information. But banks also value two other aspects of the information supplied by CIRs. First, the 
timeliness and accuracy of the information, that is to say, the time lag between any event affecting 
borrowers' behavior and its transmission to the creditors' files. The shorter this time interval the 
more rapidly the credit registry traces the changes in the borrower's economic and financial 
conditions. Second, the degree of completeness of the information in terms of its market coverage, 
meaning by that the CIR's capacity to provide information on the borrower's behavior in other 
segments of the credit market, such as trade finance, consumer credit, real-estate markets, capital 
markets, and so on. 
7 Indeed, some of the large commercial banks have replaced their own business records by similar 
information gathered and processed by Serasa, Brazil's largest CIR. 
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affected borrowers' ability to pay. High volatility in interest and 
exchange rates, varying restrictions on terms and conditions for 
lending, and trade liberalization are examples of macroeconomic 
outcomes that have made banks face large swings in market as 
well as credit risks. 
The importance of negative information in credit analysis 
decreases as the size and complexity of the loan operation in-
crease. Its role is therefore less important in the so-called 
middle-market, which seems to be the most profitable business 
lending activity in Brazil. Banks use two types of information to 
make loan decisions in this credit segment: firstly, black and 
white information provided by CIRs and by other lenders 
and, secondly, data collected by the bank itself through balance-
sheet analysis and on-site visits to firms. In most cases, lenders 
use the CIR information either to check or to complement their 
own private information and analysis. There are financial insti-
tutions that even maintain their own in-house credit rating 
facility. Some more aggressive banks in this market segment 
almost disregard the usual published balance-sheet data, on 
account of their misrepresentation of the actual economic and 
financial situation of companies. Instead, they replace the formal 
accounting information with an internally created managerial 
information system to trace the actual changes in the company's 
financial conditions. One important part of such a system is to 
monitor the liquidity of the borrowers' receivables (mainly dupli-
catas) since the latter are the most commonly accepted collateral 
for business loans in Brazil. The data and analysis of borrowers' 
creditworthiness gathered by internally developed management 
information systems remain private to the bank and are not 
shared with credit bureaus. 
In the case of loans to large firms (private corporations, 
Brazilian and multinational, and some state-owned firms), infor-
mation provided by CIRs has a very limited role in the credit 
analysis process, in comparison to the research and analysis 
conducted by the lender itself, coupled with whatever private 
information has been previously gathered by the financial inter-
mediary. Audited balance sheets and other financial statements 
are also valuable in such cases because they are more reliable 
than for smaller firms. In particular, many of these borrowers, 
being public corporations (with shares quoted in domestic or US 
stock markets, or having raised funds abroad through issuance 
of eurobonds or through debt instruments in Brazilian markets, 
such as debentures and commercial papers) have to provide 
investors with a regular flow of information on their economic and 
financial conditions. The credit process takes longer and is 
obviously more costly, relatively to other lending operations. 
Lending to the so-called corporate sector accounts for a large 
proportion of the total credit portfolio of Brazilian retail banks, 
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though its client-base is very small. Spreads are also rather 
narrow in this type of credit operations. 8 
An important feature of the Brazilian credit market that 
comes through rather clearly from the above description is its 
division in three segments, which differ with respect to typical 
loan size and the nature and amount of information on borrowers 
used by creditors. In the retail market the number of loan 
applications is very large, loan size is small, interest rates are high 
and the credit-decision process is decentralized and automated, 
relying mostly on outsourced, black information. In the middle 
market, banks tend to base their decisions on internally collected 
information, which is often obtained from a continued banking 
relationship with borrowers. This information remains private to 
the bank. The very poor quality of the information contained in 
those borrowers' balance sheets, largely a result of pervasive tax 
evasion and poor accounting practices, makes information on the 
borrower's cash flows extremely valuable to assess her actual 
creditworthiness. A third market segment comprises foreign and 
large national corporations, which for various reasons keep much 
better accounting, which is largely public information. In this 
market segment there are fewer borrowers, but loans tend to be 
larger and interest rates lower than in the other segments. 
Some of these features of the Brazilian credit market are 
evident in Table 2.1, which shows the distribution of borrowers 
with total debts of R$ 20,000 or more in any single financial 
institution, according to loan size and number of institutions with 
which they contracted those loans. 9 On the whole, there were 1.1 
million individual borrowers in this group on June 30, 2000, with 
outstanding debts of R$ 65,0 billion, each of them owing on 
average R$ 58,878. For the 178.8 thousand firms in the same 
category, total debts added to R$ 162,3 billion, corresponding to 
an average loan of R$ 907,489 per firm. 
Brazilian borrowers tend in general to prefer single-bank 
relationships. In the case of individual borrowers, only one in 
every twenty owes money to more than one institution. This 
pattern is heavily influenced by the behavior of small debtors, 
that is, those with total loans between R$ 20,000 and R$ 50,000, 
who account for 66% of all individuals with debts above 20 
thousand reais, and who only exceptionally (0.5% likelihood) 
borrow from more than one institution. Among mid-sized indi-
vidual borrowers (R$ 50,000 < I R$ 200,000) single banking is 
8 They can vary from 0.5% to 5.0% p.a., with the lending rate following closely the changes in the 
basic domestic interest rate (Gazeta Mercantil, September 22nd, 1999). These contrast with much 
higher average spreads on commercial loans, which in September 1999 reached 36.9% (Central 
Bank). 
9 Not shown in Table 2.1 are the loans to borrowers with debts of less than 20 thousand reais in any 
single financial institution. Overall, these account for 30 percent of the total credit extended to 
individuals and firms in Brazil (RS 325.0 billion on June 30, 2000), with RS 53.0 billion lent to 
individuals and RS 44.8 billion to firms. 
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Table 2.1 
Distribution of Borrowers According to Value of Total Loans 40 Extended by 
the Financial System and the Number of Institutions that Have Extended 
Those Loans (June 30, 2000) a 
Sum of Loans 
Extended to Each 
Borrower (I) in 000 RS 














20 5 I 5 35 503.118 55.372 2.450 1.690 135 342 26 113 4 105 505.733 5.622 
35 < I _. 50 223.325 20.621 4.600 3.203 119 250 13 86 1 67 228.058 24.227 
50 < 15 100 246.001 21.005 20.458 13.030 1.187 2.242 83 258 11 224 267.740 36.759 
100 < 1 5 200 63.534 8.475 14.702 7.891 2.837 4.652 424 1.499 79 582 81.576 23.099 
200 < 15 1.000 8.620 6.460 5.712 5.578 2.412 4.883 842 3.452 397 4.451 17.983 24.824 
1.000 < / .5 10.000 1.021 2.032 504 1.514 266 1.324 170 1,128 172 4.234 2.133 10.232 
10000 <15 50000 41 238 27 138 10 129 5 131 12 943 95 1.579 
50.000 < i s  100.000 5 47 - 13 - 18 - 20 - 165 5 263 
> 100.000 3 42 1 13 1 11 - 8 - 153 5 227 
Total 1.045.668 114.292 48.454 33,070 6.967 13.851 1.563 6,695 676 10,924 1.103,328 178.832 
Source: Central Bank. 
a Includes only borrowers with debts of RS 20 thousand or more in any single financial institution. On June 30. 2000, 
1 USD = RS 1.769. 
also prevalent, with only 11.4% of them having debts with more 
than one institution. Even among large borrowers (1> R$ 200,000) 
single banking is common, although 52% of them have debts with 
two or more institutions. 
Single-banking is also dominant among firms, which how-
ever tend to diversify their sources of loans more than individuals. 
Considering all firms with debts of R$ 20,000 or more, we have 
that just 36.1% of them borrow from more than one bank. In the 
case of small debtors single banking is more prevalent, with only 
one in every ten firms owing money to more than one institution. 
Mid-size commercial debtors tend to operate with more banks 
than small ones, but yet 49.3% of them have debts with only one 
institution and 35.0% with just two institutions. For large com-
mercial debtors, however, multiple-bank relationships are the 
norm, with only 23.8% of them operating with a single institution. 
Below we present a simple model with interbank asymme-
try of information that produces the sort of market segmentation 
described above. Segmentation arises because good borrowers 
are "informationally captured" by the institution with which they 
bank, and as a consequence end up paying higher interest rates 
than they would in the standard symmetric information case. The 
assumption that in the context of interbank asymmetry of infor-
mation inside banks are able to extract rents from safe borrowers 
is standard in models that feature relationship banking. 1° Differ-
ently from those models, however, we assume that, one, even for 
10 See, for instance, Sharpe (1990), Besanko and Thakor (1993), and Padilla and Pagano (2000). 
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the inside bank, there is a cost to assess borrower type; and, two, 
that a borrower can evade this "information trap," by making its 
type known to outside banks, even if at a cost, what constrains 
the monopoly power of the inside bank." We then use the model 
to conduct some comparative static exercises to see how this 
market structure changes with banks' borrowing rates and the 
cost of information. 
2.2. The Model 
The model has 2 types of borrowers, safe and risky, with 
probabilities of default 1-q, and 1-q, (q, < q), respectively. When 
borrowers default, the bank receives nothing. Borrowers differ also 
with respect to how much the loan is worth to them (v), and to the 
size of the loan (1) they seek, which is assumed to be independent 
of v. For consumers v may be interpreted as the rate of time 
preference and for firms as the rate of return they expect to obtain 
from investing the money they borrowed. We assume that v is 
uniformly distributed in [0,17], while i has an exponential dis-
tribution with mean X. 12 For all intervals [V0 ,171 ].41..v ,L1 1c10,V140,00) 
there is a proportion p of safe borrowers. Borrowers' rate of return 
or time preference and the size of the loan they seek are private 
information, but their distributions are common knowledge. All 
banks and borrowers are assumed to be risk neutral. 
At the beginning of each period, each borrower has a 
banking relationship with a single bank. 13 It is easier for this 
incumbent bank than for all other banks to ascertain this bor-
rower's type, but there is also a cost associated to this. 14 To make 
her type known to outside banks, entering what we call the 
corporate market, a borrower has to spend C c. Alternatively, she 
may decide to reveal her type to the incumbent bank at a cost C M 
 (< Cc). 15 We assume Cc and CM to be public information. Finally, 
11 There is also a difference of degree: the information advantage that the inside bank has vis-a-vis 
outside banks from being able to infer a borrower's shadow accounts is likely to be much larger than 
the one it would be able to derive from a "normal - banking relationship. Moreover, this privileged 
access concerns not only the ability to better discern negative facts about the borrower, which could 
be hidden by accounting tricks, but especially positive factors, that while widely publicized in 
advanced economies, will be kept under wraps in countries in which tax evasion is widespread. 
12 In Annex B we present the empirical distributions of loan size for individuals and firms on June 30, 
2000. Because these reflect the distribution of loans actually extended, they do not necessarily have 
to be exponentially distributed, even if the ex-ante distribution is. Comparing the empirical 
distribution with the exponential, lognormal, uniform and Weibull distributions with the same mean 
we find that the exponential distribution provides the best fit in the case of individual borrowers, 
but not for firms, for which the lognormal gives a closer approximation. 
13 It is not necessary to assume that borrowers do not bank with other institutions, but simply that 
only one of these has sufficient information on the borrower's financial data to securely ascertain at 
a low cost whether she is safe or risky. 
14 In practice, because it is necessary to process the relevant information and due to high market 
volatility, which causes borrower type to change frequently. 
15 One way to interpret C c is as being the cost to hire a rating agency. But in the Brazilian context a 
more relevant factor tends to be the cost of conducting business in a formal way, with proper 
accounting. In particular, because this makes tax evasion more difficult, increasing borrower's tax 
expenditures. So we attribute most of the difference between C c and CM to the difficulty of borrowers 
who tap the corporate market to evade their taxes. 
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a borrower may opt not to reveal her type and borrow in the retail 
market. There is no fixed cost in accessing the retail market. 16 
The credit market is then divided in three segments: 
corporate, middle and retail. In the first, there is perfect symmetry 
of information and all banks know whether the potential borrower 
is safe or risky. In the retail market no bank knows a borrower's 
type, and complete asymmetry of information prevails between 
banks and borrowers. We assume that the number of banks is 
sufficiently large for loans in the corporate and retail markets to 
be priced competitively. The middle-market is characterized by a 
close banking relationship, so that only one bank knows whether 
the potential borrower is safe. This sort of interbank information 
asymmetry exists in all credit markets, but what is peculiar in 
Brazil and possibly in other developing countries is the magnify-
ing effect of tax evasion and poor accounting practices, with only 
one bank being able to observe the actual cash flow, and indirectly 
the creditworthiness, of the borrower. We assume that each bank 
acts as a monopolist in its middle market segment.'' 
The game is played as follows. Initially, banks set a menu 
of interest rates for the three market segments. Borrowers then 
decide whether or not to tap the market, and, if they decide to 
borrow, in which market segment to do so. A Nash equilibrium 
may then be derived by fixing the menu of interest rates so that 
banks maximize their expected profits conditional on borrowers' 
optimal reactions. 
A safe borrower i will choose the corporate market iff (if and 
only if) 
qs(vi - Rc) li > Cc and Cc - CM < 4(4 - ledqs, that is, 
 
CC 
 vi > Rsc + ins 
(Cc - Cm) 
	=L > 
qs(Rsm R) 	c 
   
16 The results do not change if we assume instead that it is the bank that initially incurs the cost C c 
 or CM and later charges it to the borrower, as long as (i) the latter still incurs some upfront cost to 
apply for credit and (ii) the mechanism to screen borrower type always correctly identifies her type 
and she knows that. The model would not change either if we assumed that banks pay for screening 
borrowers and afterwards charge this cost to them by way of interest rate spread s so that s(0 = 
where j = M or C for the middle and corporate markets, respectively. 
17 The realization that a continuous financial contact between a bank and its clients generates valuable 
information dates back to Kane and Mandel (1965) and Black (1975). Fama (1985) noted that this 
information is important for both screening and monitoring purposes. Lummer and McConnell 
(1989) present empirical evidence that the information generated by close bank relationships is well 
valued by market participants. Besanko and Thakor (1993) analyze the importance of relationship 
banking for both lenders and borrowers and argue that the rents earned by banks from that 
relationship may be an important incentive to avoid the moral hazard problems created by 
risk-insensitive deposit insurance. Boot (forthcoming) reviews the recent literature on relationship 
banking and the empirical evidence on its value for borrowers and lenders. 
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Cm < li(RT - Rsm)q s , 
ui > 	+ 
cm 
liqs 
=LM < I i < Lc  





where Rsc  and R, are the interest rates charged to safe borrowers 
in the corporate and middle markets, respectively. Competition 
in the corporate market ensures that Rc = (1 + R)/q s - 1, where R 
is the banks' borrowing rate. Condition (2.1) states that a safe 
borrower will be interested in accessing the corporate market only 
if the expected net benefit of the loan exceeds the cost of informing 
the market about its type. Condition (2.2) says that a safe 
borrower will go to the corporate market if the savings from paying 
a lower rate of interest rate in this market segment more than 
compensate the additional cost of revealing her type to outside 
banks. These imply essentially that the corporate market is the 
best option for large safe borrowers. 
Safe borrowers will choose the middle market iff 
qs(vi — Rsm) 1i > CM, cc — CM  > vRsm — Rdqs , 	 and 
1 + R  
RT 	 T 
—
1 
PTIgs + 	— 19- )qr 
is the interest rate charged from borrowers in the retail market, 
with pT being the proportion of credit extended to safe borrowers 
in that market segment. 18 LM and Lc are, respectively, the lower 
and upper bounds of the middle market and, because they depend 
on the menu of interest rates, are determined endogenously. 
Finally, a safe borrower will operate in the retail market iff 
vi > RT 	 (2.5) and 
Ii < LM 	 (2.6), 
In equilibrium, all risky borrowers, independently of loan 
size and expected return, will be in the retail market, since it is 
always the case that 
RT 	_  1 q+7. R 	< Rrm 
18 Note that because the average loan size granted to risky borrowers in the retail market will be larger 
than the average loan size extended to safe borrowers. pT will be smaller than the proportion of safe 
borrowers in the retail market. 
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with RT being strictly lower than if pT > 0. 19 Then, a risky firm 
or consumer will be willing to borrow if v i > RT, Therefore, the share 
of loans extended to safe borrowers in the retail market, pT, is: 
T p(1 - (1 + Lm/k)e L./k) 
P = 	 (2.7) 
1 - p(1 + Lm/k)e-Lmix 
Under these assumptions, and considering a universe of 
N potential borrowers, the volume of credit extended in each of 
the three market segments is given by: 
Corporate market: 
Re) 
VC c = Npe-Le/I(Lc (V  - 
V - Cc Vqs 
Middle market: 
VCM = N 
(V - R m) Lm/X 	 -L 	 -L /X 	-L 
	[(Lm + A.)e 	- (Lc + X)e. j- 	-ec V 	 Vq s 
Retail market: 
N(V - R T) 
VC T - 	 - p(A. + fie "/X] V 
In equilibrium, banks make zero expected profit in the 
retail and corporate markets, which are actuarially balanced, and 
derive all their economic profits from the middle market, where 
they earn 
(1 + R4,r)q, - 1 - R 
for each dollar lent. Thus, total expected profit is given by 
E(II) = a 1 + Rm)q, - (1 + R))VC m 	 (2.8) 
The only decision variable in this model is the interest rate 
charged by banks to their (safe) clients in the middle market. 
When fixing this rate, banks have to take two effects into account. 
On the one hand, the higher RM, the more they earn from their 
middle-market clients. On the other hand, the more they raise 
this rate, the higher LM and the lower LC, so that less credit is 
extended through the middle market. Maximizing (2.8) with res-
pect to RM does not yield a closed form solution, but we can do 
some exercises on comparative statics using numerical maximi-
zation. In Tables 2.2 to 2.5 we conduct such an exercise, exam-
ining how the market behaves when we change the banks' 
19 Because only safe borrowers access the corporate and middle markets, from now on we drop the 
superscript s from interest rates in these two market segments. 
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borrowing cost (R), the cost of accessing the corporate and middle 
markets (Cc and CM) and borrower diversity (qs-qr). In all cases, 
unless otherwise stated, we fix R = 15%, X, = $1, N = 1,000, V= 0.8, 
Cc = $0.1, Cm = $0.01, p = 0.6, Q = 0.98 and qr = 0.8. 
To assess the impact of segmentation we compare the 
results of the model with two benchmarks in which interbank 
asymmetry of information is not present. The first is the case in 
which borrower type is public information, so that the volume of 
credit (VC) extended to safe and risky borrowers and the corres-
ponding market interest rates (R) are, respectively, 






where j = s and r stand for safe and risky borrowers, respectively, 
ps = p and pr = 1 - p. With perfect information the average loan 
size would be A. for both safe and risky borrowers. 
The other benchmark is given by a situation in which there 
is no way to determine borrower type - i.e., there is interbank 
symmetry of information, but asymmetry between borrowers and 
banks. In this case the market interest rate and the volume of 
credit to safe and risky borrowers would be 
R" = (1 + R)/q" - 1; 	 (2.11), and 
VC;* = p. (V - Fr) /V 	 (2.12), 
where q = pqs + (1 - 
It is immediate to verify that Q = (lc = qm >q >qT> qr 
RS = Rc < R**<RT <F<, and that RC < Rm < RD It follows that, if 
borrower type is not known by any bank, safe (risky) borrowers 
are worse (better) off than if borrower type was known to all banks. 
The intermediate situation of a segmented credit market, as 
modeled above, produces losers and winners. Large borrowers 
will tend to gain, particularly if C c and CM are small, but risky and 
small safe borrowers will lose. Yet, even though default and 
interest rates are higher in the retail market than in the rest of 
the credit market, risky borrowers will be better off with market 
segmentation than if complete symmetry of information prevailed. 
In this sense, interbank asymmetry of information creates a cross 
subsidy from safe to risky borrowers in the retail market. This 
subsidy will increase with borrower diversity (q s - and decline 
with Cc and CM.2° 
20 What is less intuitive is that safe borrowers in the retail segment also subsidize borrowers in the 
middle market. by reducing RT and in this way constraining the ability of the incumbent bank to 
extract rents. 
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2.3. Comparative Statics 
Compared to a situation of perfect symmetry of informa-
tion, market segmentation penalizes safe borrowers in all three 
market segments (Table 2.2). Those in the corporate market pay 
the symmetric-information interest rate for safe borrowers, but 
have to spend Cc to reveal their type, which is equivalent to an 
additional 2.8% spread (considering the parameter values used 
in this exercise). Interest rates to borrowers in the middle market 
are 4.6 percentage points above the perfect information rate of 
interest, with borrowers incurring an information cost that is 
equivalent to a 1.4% spread. Safe borrowers in the retail market 
pay an interest rate mark-up that ranges between 24.6% and 
28.6% depending on banks' borrowing rates. Risky borrowers pay 
an interest rate only marginally lower than they would if perfect 
information prevailed. These additional costs reduce the volume 
of credit extended to safe borrowers between 7% and 9%, com-
pared to the amount that would have been extended in the case 
of perfect information symmetry. As a consequence, default rates 
are also higher than when borrower type is known to all banks. 
Contrasted to a situation in which banks have equal 
ignorance about borrower type, market segmentation benefits 
borrowers in the corporate and middle markets, who are able to 
borrow at a lower cost, information costs included. Risky borrow-
ers, in turn, are penalized with much higher rates of interest, as 
are small safe borrowers, for whom it is not worth to pay to let 
the market know its type. As a consequence, although with 
market segmentation more credit flows to safe borrowers and less 
to risky ones than when borrower type may not be inferred by 
banks, and as consequence the market default rate is lower, credit 
becomes concentrated on large borrowers. 
A decline in the cost of capital to banks lowers interest 
rates to both types of borrowers in all situations, but to a larger 
degree in the case of risky borrowers, when either market seg-
mentation or perfect information prevails. As a consequence, a 
lower proportion of total credit goes to safe borrowers, raising in 
the market's default rate, which however stays below the rate 
observed when banks are equally ignorant about borrower type. 21 
 With market segmentation, all players benefit from a reduction 
in R, with a rise in borrower surplus and bank profits. 22 
An important conclusion that follows from these results is 
that market segmentation does not substantially affect the overall 
volume and the quality of credit. By treating debtors who do not 
want to pay to credibly reveal their type essentially as risky 
21 Note that this exercise abstracts from the likely increase in q s and ch. as a result of lower interest 
rates. which would contribute to reduce default rates. 
22 Note, though, that since credit volumes rise more than profits the rate of profit per dollar lent comes 
down. 
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Table 2.2 
Credit Market Reaction to a Reduction in the Cost of Funds to Banks 
Variables 
Banks cost of capital (R) 25.0% 20.0% 15.0% 10.0% 7.5% 
With complete symmetry of information 
Interest rate 
Safe borrowers 27.6% 22.4% 17.3% 12.2% 9.70/o 
Risky borrowers 56.3% 50.0% 43.8% 37.5% 34.4% 
Volume of credit ($)a 512.2 581.6 651.2 720.7 755.4 
Safe borrowers 393.4 431.6 469.9 508.2 527.3 
Risky borrowers 118.8 150.0 181.3 212.5 228.1 
Market default rate 6.2% 6.6% 7.0% 7.3% 7.4% 
Without interbank asymmetry of information 
Interest rate (q" = 9.2% in all cases) 37.7% 32.2% 26.7% 21.1% 18.4% 
Volume of credit ($)a 529.2 598.0 666.9 735.7 770.1 
Safe borrowers 317.5 358.8 400.1 441.4 462.1 
Risky borrowers 211.7 239.2 266.7 294.3 308.0 
With interbank asymmetry of information 
Interest rate 
CorpOrate (RJ 27.6% 22.4% 17.3% 12.2% 9.7% 
Middle (RM) 32.0% 27.0% 21.9% 16.8% 14.3% 
Retail (RT) 56.2% 50.0% 43.7% 37.4% 34.3% 
Middle-market limits (S) 
Upper bound (Lc) 2.062 2.039 2.019 2.003 1.996 
Lower bound (LM) 0.042 0.044 0.047 0.049 0.051 
Volume of credit ($) 
All borrowers 475.7 545.0 614.3 683.7 718.4 
Safe borrowers 356.7 394.8 432.8 470.9 490.0 
Corporate (VCS) 143.5 160.8 178.2 195.6 204.3 
Middle (VCM) 213.1 233.7 254.4 275.0 285.3 
Retail (VCS 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 
Risky borrowers (in retail market) 119.0 150.2 181.5 212.8 228.4 
Number of borrowers 
Safe borrowers 336 373 410 448 467 
Corporate 39 45 51 57 60 
Middle 289 319 348 377 391 
Retail 7 9 11 14 15 
Avg. loan size (safe borrowers, $)b 
Corporate 3.654 3.561 3.486 3.425 3.399 
Middle 0.736 0.733 0.731 0.729 0.729 
Retail 0.021 0.022 0.023 0.025 0.025 
Market default rate 6.50% 6.96% 7.32% 7.60% 7.72% 
Banks overall profit ($) 9.30 10.32 11.34 12.36 12.87 
a Without interbank asymmetry of information. the average loan size to both safe and risky borrowers is equal to $1. 
so that the number of borrowers in each case is equal to the volume of credit extended. 
b Average loan size for risky borrowers in retail market is $1 in all cases. 
The default rate in the retail market declines very slightly, from 19.98% when R = 25.0% to 19.97% when R = 7.5%. 
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borrowers, banks limit the volume of bad credits and keep the 
market "relatively safe." The main negative consequence of mar-
ket segmentation is then the high interest rates imposed on small 
safe borrowers. 
With the parameter values used in Table 2.2, approxi-
mately 30% of all credit is granted to borrowers in the corporate 
market, who however represent less than 10% of the total number 
of borrowers (and between 4% and 6% of the universe of potential 
borrowers). Like corporate borrowers, all participants in the 
middle market are safe. But interest rates in this market segment 
are considerably higher, with RM - Rc giving the rent extracted by 
banks from middle-market borrowers. A remarkable result is that 
this rent actually rises when the cost of funds to banks declines, 
with spreads dropping less in the middle than in the corporate 
market. As a result, the range of loan values granted through the 
middle market (LM, Lc) also contracts when R comes down, 
causing the expansion in the volume of credit to be particularly 
pronounced in the retail market. The increase in LM leads to a rise 
in the average loan extended to safe borrowers in the retail 
market, but since most of the expansion in credit goes to risky 
borrowers, so does the cross subsidy provided by safe borrowers. 
The average loan size extended to safe borrowers is very 
different in the three market segments. A remarkable result is 
that the average loan extended to risky borrowers (X = $1), all in 
the retail market, is actually higher than that given to safe 
borrowers in the middle market, while 40 to 50 times bigger than 
that granted to safe borrowers in the retail segment. To some 
extent, therefore, the difference between clients in the retail and 
middle-markets is more one of risk than of size. Also important 
is that, to disguise themselves, large risky borrowers will tend to 
spread their loan requests through various banks. This may help 
to explain why, as shown in Table 2.1, many mid-sized individual 
and commercial borrowers operate with more than one bank. 23 
An important parameter in our model is the cost of inform-
ing outside banks about one's type (Cc). The higher the value of 
Cc, the more banks are able to extract rents from middle-market 
borrowers, and as a consequence the higher RM and banks' profits 
(Table 2.3). An increase in Cc and in RM, in turn, moves both Lm 
 and Lc upwards, reducing the volume of credit extended through 
the corporate market, but actually increasing lending in the 
middle and retail markets, even if the net effect is a decline in the 
total volume of lending. Because access to the corporate and 
middle markets become more expensive, proportionately more 
credit is extended to safe borrowers in the retail market, lowering 
23 This may also explain why, as shown by Cole (1998), borrowers who concentrate their financial 
transactions on a single bank are more likely to obtain credit than firms with multiple sources of 
financial services. 
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Table 2.3 
Reactions to Changes in Cost of Access to Corporate Market 
(with interbank asymmetric information) 
Variables 
Cost of access to corporate market (Cc, in $) 0.015 0.040 0.080 0.100 0.150 
Interest rate in middle market (RM) 17.6% 19.0% 21.0% 21.9% 24.1% 
Middle-market limits ($) 
Upper bound (Lc) 1.841 1.893 1.977 2.019 2.125 
Lower bound (LM ) 0.039 0.041 0.045 0.047 0.052 
Volume of credit ($) 
All borrowers 642.1 633.5 620.6 614.3 599.6 
Safe borrowers 460.6 452.1 439.1 432.8 418.0 
Corporate (VCc) 210.0 200.1 185.2 178.2 161.6 
Middle (VCM) 250.5 251.8 253.6 254.4 256.1 
Retail (VCS 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 
Risky borrowers in retail market 181.4 181.5 181.5 181.5 181.6 
Number of safe borrowers 
Corporate 72 66 56 51 . 41 
Middle 365 360 352 348 339 
Retail 9 11 11 12 14 
Avg. loan size (safe borrowers, $)a 
Corporate 2.896 3.051 3.329 3.486 3.943 
Middle 0.686 0.699 0.720 0.731 0.756 
Retail 0.019 0.020 0.022 0.023 0.026 
Market default rate b 7.09% 7.16% 7.26% 7.32% 7.45% 
Banks overall profit ($) 0.68 3.99 8.98 11.34 16.87 
'Average loan size for risky borrowers in retail market is $1 in all cases. 
bThe default rate in the retail market declines very slightly. from 19.98% when C c = 80.015 to 19.96% when Cc= $0.15. 
RT and attracting more risky borrowers, in the end raising the 
market default rate. 
Therefore, although beneficial to banks, an increase in C c 
 harms almost all borrowers: (i) it moves borrowers in the lower 
end of the corporate market into the middle market, where they 
pay higher rates of interest; (ii) it allows banks to extract more 
rents from borrowers in the middle market; and (iii) it moves 
borrowers in the lower fringe of the middle market into the retail 
market, where interest rates are the highest. Still, safe borrowers 
already in the retail market and risky borrowers in general obtain 
a small gain from an increase in C c, due to the marginal decline 
in Rr It follows, conversely, that measures that contribute to 
reduce the cost for outside banks to infer borrower type, such as 
the adoption of better accounting practices, should help to reduce 
default rates, expand the volume of credit and benefit most 
borrowers. Still, inasmuch as this cost is due more to tax evasion 
than to poor accounting, the capacity of public policy to reduce 
the "information capture" of middle-market borrowers is in a 
sense rather limited. 
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A reduction in the value of CM, the cost of informing the 
inside bank of one's type, attracts safe borrowers in the upper 
fringe of the retail market to the middle market, shifting upwards 
the demand for middle-market loans, and consequently allowing 
for a rise in RM and in profits (Table 2.4). Despite facing higher 
interest rates, most borrowers in the middle market experience a 
net gain from this process, with the only losers being those in the 
upper end of this market segment, including those that as a 
consequence move to the corporate market. With fewer and only 
the very small safe borrowers remaining in the retail market, RT  
goes up, lowering the demand for credit of risky borrowers, which 
in turn causes the market default rate to decline. With a low C M, 
the retail market will essentially serve only risky borrowers. 
In Table 2.5 we see that borrower diversity (q 5 - qr) is good 
for banks. If risky borrowers become less so, as in the second 
column of Table 2.5, banks have to bring spreads down in the 
Table 2.4 
Reactions to Changes in Cost of Access to Middle Market 
(asymmetric information) 
Variables 
Cost of Access to Middle Market (CM ) 0.020 0.010 0.005 0.001 
Interest rates 
Middle (RM ) 21.3% 21.9% 22.2% 22.4% 
Retail (RT) 43.6% 43.7% 43.7% 43.7% 
Middle-market limits ($) 
Upper bound (LC ) 2.041 2.019 2.009 2.002 
Lower bound (LM ) 0.092 0.047 0.024 0.005 
Volume of credit ($) 
All borrowers 611.4 614.3 616.1 617.7 
Safe borrowers 429.2 432.8 434.8 436.4 
Corporate (VCd 175.7 178.2 179.4 180.2 
Middle (VC M) 252.4 254.4 255.4 256.2 
Retail (VC74 1.1 0.3 0.1 0.0 
Risky borrowers in retail market 182.2 181.5 181.3 181.3 
Number of safe borrowers 583 423 424 429 
Corporate 50 51 52 52 
Middle 326 348 360 371 
Retail 206 24 12 6 
Avg. loan size (safe borrowers, $)a 
Corporate 3.512 3.486 3.475 3.466 
Middle 0.774 0.731 0.709 0.691 
Retail 0.045 0.023 0.012 0.002 
Market default rate b 7.36% 7.32% 7.30% 7.28% 
Overall credit market 
Banks overall profit ($) 9.89 11.34 12.07 12.67 
aAverage loan size for risky borrowers in retail market is $1 in all cases. 
b The clefnult rate in the retail market rises very slightly. from 19.89% when C M = S0.02 to 
20.00% when C m= $0.001. 
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Table 2.5 
Reactions to Changes in Borrower Diversity 
Variables 
Default rates 
Safe borrowers ( I -qs.) 0.020 0.020 0.150 
Risky borrowers (1-q r) 0.200 0.070 0.200 
With complete information 
Interest rates 
Safe borrowers 17.3% 17.3% 35.3% 
Risky borrowers 43.8% 23.7% 43.8% 
Volume of credit ($)a 
Safe borrowers 469.9 469.9 335.3 
Risky borrowers 181.3 281.7 181.3 
Market default rate 7.0% 3.9% 16.8% 
With asymmetric information 
Interest rates 
Corporate (Rd 17.3% 17.3% 35.3% 
Middle (RM) 21.9% 20.6% 39.5% 
Retail (RT) 43.7% 23.1% 43.3% 
Middle-market limits ($) 
Upper bound (Lc) 2.019 2.864 2.543 
Lower bound (Lm) 0.047 0.402 0.310 
Volume of credit ($) 
All borrowers 614.3 725.5 482.7 
Safe borrowers 432.8 440.9 298.9 
Corporate (VCd 178.2 99.2 86.5 
Middle (VCM) 254.4 315.2 201.7 
Retail (VC T) 0.3 26.5 10.8 
Risky borrowers in retail market 181.5 284.5 183.7 
Number of borrowers 
Safe borrowers 412 432 285 
Corporate 51 22 19 
Middle 348 269 193 
Retail 12 141 73 
Avg. loan size (safe borrowers, $) b 
Corporate 3.486 4.479 4.581 
Middle 0.731 1.174 1.045 
Retail 0.023 0.188 0.147 
Default rate 
Retail 19.97% 6.57% 19.72% 
Overall credit market 7.32% 3.96% 16.90% 
Banks overall profit ($) 11.34 9.91 7.14 
aWith perfect information. the average loan size to both safe and risky borrowers is equal 
to $1. so that the number of borrowers in each case is equal to the volume of credit extended. 
bAverage loan size for risky borrowers in retail market is $ I in all cases. 
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middle market, and although this contributes to raise lending 
volumes, profits and especially profit rates come down. Interest 
rates drop very substantially in the retail market, causing the 
number of borrowers and volume of credit to boom. If the decline 
in borrower diversity arises from an increase in the default rate 
of safe borrowers (column 3), profits fall even more, as a result of 
lower spreads and volume of credit in the middle market. The 
retail market also becomes relatively more attractive in this case, 
with an increase in Lim and a decline in RT. 
More information on borrowers, due mainly to the decline 
in inflation, and lower interest rates, since 1999, were the most 
important changes that took place in Brazilian credit markets in 
the turn of the century. The above exercises suggest that although 
very relevant these changes should not eliminate or substantially 
alter market segmentation. In the next section we look at another 
important change in Brazilian credit markets, the strengthening 
of the CIR industry, and examine the extent to which this should 
significantly weaken credit market segmentation. 
3. Credit Information 
3.1. Implications of Market Segmentation to the CIR 
Industry 
A credit market as featured in the model of Section 2.2 
implicates a limited role for CIRs: essentially, maintaining black 
information and providing good ratings for safe borrowers in the 
corporate sector. In particular, there are no incentives for banks 
to share white information on borrowers, partly or completely, 
since by doing that they lose or at least reduce the rent they are 
able to extract from clients in the middle market (e.g., by lowering 
Cc), while gaining nothing in return, since banks make no profit 
in the retail and corporate markets. 
Banks will be in general willing to share black information. 
If such a borrower is in the retail market, the bank will not loose 
anything from not lending to her, while by blocking her access to 
credit it will make her more likely to settle her debts. Black lists 
should be less effective in encouraging debt repayment in the 
middle market, since in this case the bank will have to weigh the 
expected gain from enforcement against the lost rent if it refuses 
to lend. 24 If the borrower is safe and sufficiently large to tap the 
24 That is, the fact that the bank knows that the borrower is safe, despite having defaulted in the past, 
weakens the enforcement incentive of black lists. A comparable result is obtained by Padilla and 
Pagano (2000). who observe that a situation of complete information about borrower type may give 
borrowers weaker incentives to perform (i.e., strive to succeed with their projects) than one in which 
banks know only whether a borrower defaulted or not. 
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corporate market, enforcement incentives will again be weak, 
since the borrower may negotiate a loan with another bank 
allowing for a marginally positive profit to the lender. In these 
cases, how effective are black lists as an enforcement mechanism 
will depend on market structure and other incentives. Still, 
banks will have no incentive not to provide black information (or 
at least threaten to), and will have some to do so, even if access 
to credit is not entirely blocked. In the middle market, for ins-
tance, since outside banks cannot differentiate middle from retail 
market borrowers, inclusion of a safe borrower in default in a 
black list will increase the bank's bargaining power and conse-
quently the rent it is able to extract. 
In a segmented credit market, the use of black lists as 
an enforcement mechanism should extend to the willingness 
of lenders to drop borrowers from the list if they settle their 
debts, as this will increase their incentives to repay, while 
doing little harm to creditors, since information in these lists 
is scarcely useful, even if borrower type is persistent through 
time. For the middle and corporate segments, these lists have 
little use due to the point made above: whether a loan is 
granted or not depends on borrower type, and since in those 
market segments this is known for sure, there is little sense 
in trying to infer it from such lists. Black lists are more useful 
for credit decisions in the retail market. Since borrowers who 
defaulted are more likely to be risky than those that did not 
or that had not been in the market before, and since on 
average banks lose money when they lend to risky borrowers, 
it makes sense to deny credit to firms and individuals in 
black lists. 25 But considering that interest rates in the retail 
market are very close to those that would be charged to risky 
borrowers if perfect information prevailed, recovering de-
faulted loans will likely be more important than the addi-
tional risky of extending a loan to a borrower who defaulted 
in the past, particularly if lenders are shortsighted (as they 
should be in an environment of very high interest rates). 
The role of credit bureaus in a segmented credit market 
may be more broadly assessed if we assume that not all informa-
tion that is relevant to predict borrower type is private to banks 
(as illustrated by the existence of black lists). In this way, suppose 
that banks can improve their ability to infer borrower type by 
acquiring and processing information z (0 z 1), at a cost 
C(z) = co + c1 z NAT - where co and c1 > 0, and NAT is the number 
of loan applicants in the retail sector - as presented in Table 3.1, 
(1- 4:3,X1- p) 	(1- 	qr - 19 )  25 	Pkiskyldefauld- 	 = (1- P)= P[riskY]= 
[(1- qrX1- 13) + P(1 - qs)] 
> 
[(1- qrX1- 14+ P(1- qr)] 
qr(1- P) 	> cir(1- P) 	= P[riskylno default for qs > qr. 
[qr(1- P) + Pqr] [qr (1- P)+ Pqs1 
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Table 3.1 
Probability of Correctly Inferring Borrower Type 
Actual Borrower 	 Inferred Borrower Type (Y) 
Type (X) 	
Safe (Y =1) 	 Risky (Y=0) 
Safe (X=1) 
	
P(X=1. Y=1) = p a(z) 	P(X=1. Y=0) = p (1-a(z)) 
	
P(X=1) = p 
Risky (X=0) 
	
P(X=O. Y=1) = p (1-a(z)) P(X=O. Y=0) = (1-p)-p (1-a.(z)) P(X=0) = 1-p 
P(Y= 1) = p 	 P(Y=0) = 1-p 
where a(z) = p + z(a - p).26 The information cost C(z) is charged on 
a pro rata basis to borrowers in the retail market, with each paying 
CT(z) = C(z)/NB T(z), where NBT is the number of borrowers in the 
retail market. 27 In addition, banks charge an interest rate R T to 
applicants who they consider to be safe - for reasons similar to 
those noted in Section 2, loan applicants thought to be risky will 
not borrow in this market segment. 
The use of the screening technology will further fragment 
the market, since it will allow for the creation of a new market 
segment, which we will call superretail (57), that operates in the 
same way as the retail segment did in Section 2.2: no questions 
are asked, no initial fees charged, and all borrowers are charged 
the same (high) rate Rte. f-t, (1 + R)/ q r. - 1. In this sense, the tech-
nology should not change one main characteristic of the credit 
market: the negative correlation across market segments between 
average loan size on the one hand and spreads and default ratios 
on the other. Market segments will change, however, with their 
limits becoming as defined in Table 3.2. We see that: 
(i)The corporate market continues to operate as described 
in Section 2. 
(ii)The middle market now has borrowers of two types, both 
of them safe. The first are those discussed in Section 2 - not large 
enough to tap the corporate market, but sufficiently big to be 
willing to spend CM to show that they are safe. The second are 
those who would prefer to borrow in the retail market, but 
because they were wrongly considered to be risky resort to the 
middle market. 
(iii) The retail market continues to have safe and risky 
borrowers, but the latter in a lower proportion. All risky borrowers 
for whom (1.11.(v i - 	> CT and Ii > 14 will apply for a loan in the 
retail market, and actually borrow if (mistakenly) considered to 
be safe. Similarly, all safe borrowers for whom L4< li < 4, and 
26 Most of the following results would also apply if a(z) = p + F(z)(Ft - p), where F(z) is any cumulative 
distribution function. 
27 This is equivalent to assume that borrowers pay an interest rate spread to cover the cost banks incur 
when using the screening technology. which declines with loan size so that s(1) = CT/1, where s(1) is 
the spread charged for a loan of size L 
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Table 3.2 
Credit Market Segmentation with Screening Technology 
Market Segment 
Corporate (all safe) 
Middle - I (all safe) 
Middle - II (all safe) 
Retail - I: Safe and classified as safe 
Retail - Risky and classified as safe 
Superretail - I: Very small safe 
Superretail - II: Very small risky 
Superretail - HI: Small safe 
Superretail - IV: Other risky 
Loan Range 
(A) 
1.> (Cc - Cm)/((Rm - Rd%) = Lc 
 Lc > Ii > (Cm- C-7)/((RT - Rm)qs) = LM 
1.4z = (CM -  CT)/((Rsr - Rm)qs) < 1i < LM 
cT/c(RsT- R740 < Lm 
> jr = CT/((Rs,- RT)q,.) 
< 
11 < LT  
4<ii<L4 




vi > Rc + Cc/(qsli) 
vi > RM + Cm/ (qsli) 
v, > RM + Cm/ (qsli) 
v, > RT + Cr/ (qs4) 
v i > RT + Cr/ 44 
vu > 
v, Rsr 
 v, > RsT



















- Rr) > Cr will apply for a loan in the retail market. Those 
who are considered safe will go ahead and borrow in this market 
segment. 
(iv) Small safe and risky borrowers (those who seek loans 
lower than LT and 4, respectively); safe borrowers who initially 
sought credit in the retail market but were wrongly considered to 
be risky, and for whom I t < and all risky borrowers unable to 
access the retail market will go to the "superretail" market 
segment, as long as they have v i > Rte,. 
For the technology to co-exist with market segmentation it 
can be neither too efficient and cheap nor insufficiently so. On 
the one hand, it is necessary that Ti < 1 or CT > CM. To see that, 
suppose the contrary, that for z a(z) = 1 and that C TS) < C. 
Then, for a sufficiently large z it would be possible to perfectly 
identify borrower type with the use of information accessible to 
all banks. Competition would then drive Rr down to Rc. Because 
C4-2) < Cm, all safe borrowers would go to the retail market and 
only this and the super retail market segments would survive. 28 
 Therefore, segmentation of the credit market is not consistent 
with a technology that allows perfect screening at a low cost with 
the use of information that is publicly available. 
28 If CT(2) > CM, then (i) if C7(2) > Cc, the technology, although precise, would not be used, at least with 
z 2, since it would be too expensive and for that reason outcompeted by the technology used to 
identify borrowers in the corporate market; (ii) if CO 5 C c, then the opposite would happen, and 
the technology would be the one used in the corporate market, with the situation returning otherwise 
to that described in Section 2. 
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On the other hand, the technology must be sufficiently 
cheap (low CT) and accurate (low RT) so as to make the retail 
market competitive vis-a-vis the middle and superretail markets 
for at least some loan values. That is, the interest rate in the retail 
market must be sufficiently lower than in the superretail market 
and not much higher than in the middle market so as to compen-
sate, from the point of view of a sufficiently large number of safe 
borrowers, the fixed fee (C T) they have to pay when contracting a 
loan in the retail market. That means that for at least some z > 0, 
Lm > LT , which requires 
CM Rs. - RM  
CT > Rs r - RT  
(3.1). 
Therefore, while, on the one hand, the screening technol-
ogy may be unlikely to be used, for it will have to be reasonably 
cheap and efficient to be adopted, on the other hand, if intro-
duced, it may completely change the nature of the credit market. 
In fact, we may verify that with competition in the retail segment 
and banks seeking to maximize profits, only two extreme possi-
bilities exist. One, banks do not use the technology and the retail 
and superretail segments become the same, as was the case in 
Section 2. Two, the polar situation ensues, with R7- arbitrarily 
close to RM and Lm relatively large, so that almost all credit is 
channeled through the retail market. The following reasons ex-
plain why the no-technology equilibrium is the only feasible 
solution even for reasonably efficient and low cost screening 
technologies: 
[1] Due to economies of scale in the use of the screening 
technology, and the fact that all but the very small risky borrowers 
want to borrow in the retail market, a separate retail market is 
feasible only if RT is sufficiently low as to cause a substantial 
volume of safe credit to be extended through that market segment, 
in this way making the default rate and the borrowing fee (q) 
consistent with that demand. We can show that even for rather 
cheap and moderately accurate screening technologies it is not 
possible to generate such a solution unless RM is relatively high. 
[2] If the screening technology is sufficiently accurate and 
cheap as to satisfy (3.1), competition in the retail market will lead 
to a reduction in RT such that the middle market will vanish, 
except for the provision of loans to safe borrowers who are 
mistakenly considered risky. This is possible because by lowering 
RT down to RM, banks are able to increase the volume of credit to 
safe borrowers in the retail segment by a larger extent than to 
risky borrowers, in this way lowering the default rate in a way 
consistent with the reduction in Rr 
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[3) But banks will react by making the middle market more 
attractive - and in this way deriving some profit - by lowering RM  
to a point where the technology is no longer able to generate a 
feasible solution to the retail market. Because banks can lower 
RM down to slightly more than Rc, and still make a profit, only if 
the technology is very accurate and cheap, so as to outcompete 
banks in the middle market, will it be used, in this case eliminat-
ing in practice the middle market. 
The above argument is illustrated numerically in Table 3.3, 
where we show how competition between the retail and middle 
markets works when the screening technology is available, in this 
case with rx = 0.97, c o = $1 and c1 = $ 0.001 (variables presented 
in Table 3.3 are derived in Annex C). In columns A to E, banks' 
borrowing rate is fixed at 25%, and initially banks charge the 
profit maximizing rate RM = 32% in the middle market. One of 
the possible ways the screening technology may be introduced 
is presented in column A, where RT = 32.5%, substantially below 
the no-screening rate of 56.2% (see first column of Table 2.2). In 
this case, the retail market takes up the lower half of what used 
to be the middle market, reducing the amount of credit exten-
ded through this market segment to about half its previous size, 
with banks' profits falling in tandem. 
Despite the high efficiency of the technology, correctly 
predicting borrower type in 92.4% of the cases, about a fifth of all 
lending in the retail market goes to risky borrowers, causing the 
default rate in this segment, 5.7%, to be almost the triple of that 
observed in the middle and corporate markets (2%). The technol-
ogy is made competitive by the lower cost of screening borrowers 
($0.0044 vs. $0.01 in the middle market) and the relatively high 
rates of interest charged by banks in the middle market. 
There are many feasible ways to use the technology in the 
retail market, for a given rate of interest in the middle market, 
but only one that maximizes the number of borrowers in this 
segment. This is the one presented in column B, where we see 
that through a less intensive use of information (lower z) than in 
column A, banks are able to lower CT, extend a larger volume of 
credit to safe borrowers and reduce R7- to an extent that makes 
borrowing in the middle market completely unattractive, except 
for those safe borrowers who are mistakenly classified as risky by 
the technology, what occurs with a probability of 18.4%. As a 
result, banks' profits fall even more, to less than a fifth of what 
they used to be before the introduction of the technology. 
Obviously, one should expect banks to react, lowering RM  
to make the middle market more attractive to borrowers, in the 
process stealing some of the clients who used to go to the corpo-
rate market (as reflected in the rise in La). This will also lead to a 
reduction in RI, to keep the technology viable, as shown in column 
C, but yet succeed in increasing profits, even if to only a third of 
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Table 3.3 
Model Solutions With Screening Technology*. 
Case A B C D E F G H I J 
Parameters R = 0.25 R = 0.15 
co 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 
R,4 0.320000 0.320000 0.290000 0.290000 0.288000 0.219000 0.219000 0.186000 0.186000 0.185000 
Variables 
RT 0.324962 0.320004 0.294644 0.290003 0.562144 0.225677 0.219003 0.188407 0.186003 0.437114 
CT 0.0044 0.0038 0.0039 0.0042 0.0000 0.0042 0.0032 0.0025 0.0037 0.0000 
qT 0.943 0.947 0.966 0.969 0.800 0.938 0.943 0.968 0.970 0.800 
z 0.877 0.584 0.992 0.915 0.000 0.914 0.531 0.926 0.925 0.000 
c4z) 0.924 0.816 0.967 0.939 0.600 0.938 0.796 0.943 0.942 0.600 
14 
0.019 0.016 0.015 0.016 0.000 0.020 0.015 0.010 0.015 0.000 
l,', 0.024 0.026 0.023 0.022 0.037 0.027 0.032 0.031 0.025 0.040 
Lm.- 1.161 1.734.740 1.347 1.734.740 0.037 0.880 2.531.229 3.195 2.516.079 0.040 
L, 2.064 2.206 6.338 6.747 7.353 2.017 2.169 7.329 7.837 7.965 
NA; 231 354 268 377 7 236 429 432 454 11 
NA.7. 227 231 243 245 119 275 281 299 297 181 
NU; 213 289 260 353 4 221 342 407 427 6 
NE4 26 63 12 22 71 25 86 26 26 109 
VC7. 104.3 291.5 140.7 356.1 0.1 87.2 345.1 356.4 431.3 0.1 
VC1. 26.6 65.5 12.3 23.2 71.4 26.3 88.1 26.2 26.3 108.9 
VC M  110.6 41.6 231.2 22.8 374.3 168.4 55.2 97.8 26.0 452.1 
Profit 4.82 1.81 3.28 0.32 4.58 7.51 2.46 1.20 0.32 5.11 
• In all cases. we fix -A.=$1, N=1.000. V=0.8. Cc=S0.1. Cm =$0.01, p=0.6. qs=0.98 and qr=0.8. c1 =S0.001 and F. = 0.97. 
" In columns B. D. G and I. the upper end of the retail market is given by Lc. 
the pre-technology level. Again, however, competition is not ex-
pected to leave things at that, and, as shown in column D, through 
a combination of lower interest rates and a less intensive use of 
information than in column C (although much higher than in 
column B), the retail market again wipes out the attractiveness 
of the middle market as a borrower's first option, with banks' 
profits coming down to almost nothing. 
But again one should not expect banks to stand still 
against this loss of profitability. In this way, note in column E 
that by marginally reducing RM, to 28.8%, banks are able to make 
the screening technology unfeasible - in the sense that it is not 
possible to attract to the retail market a sufficiently large volume 
of lending to safe borrowers to make R 7. competitive (i.e., satisfy 
condition (3.1). In this final outcome, profits are reduced to half 
their value in Table 2.2, RM is 3.2 percentage points below its 
profit-maximizing level (when the technology is not available), and 
the middle market covers a much wider range of the credit market, 
stealing the upper end of the retail market and a substantial part 
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of the corporate segment. 29 RT, however, is back to its previous 
level, so that existence of the technology, when this is not used, 
benefits most of all borrowers in the middle market, even if there 
are some positive spillovers to borrowers that used to be in the 
upper (lower) end of the retail (corporate) market. 
In columns F to J we repeat the previous exercise while 
fixing R at 15%. The results are very similar to the previous ones, 
with two important differences. First, maximization of the number 
of borrowers in columns G and I is carried out with less informa-
tion per borrower (lower z) than in columns B and D, respectively, 
so that the probability of misclassification is higher than before. 
Second, the reduction in middle-market spreads and therefore in 
profits is also more significant. These two changes are the result 
of a higher number of safe borrowers seeking loans in the retail 
market when interest rates come down, making the screening 
technology more competitive. 
Unless the screening technology generates feasible retail 
market configurations only for values of RM above its profit 
maximizing level, and/or if setup costs are high and not recover-
able, the mere existence of the technology should be sufficient to 
bring down interest rates in the middle market. That is, if the 
costs of introducing the screening technology are low, and banks 
are slow to react to its use by a competitor, existence of the 
technology will pressure RM down, much in the same way that 
contestability operates to keep profits low. As a consequence, a 
change in conditions that facilitate introduction of the technology 
will reflect on a lower RM and a wider middle market. But two 
features of a segmented credit market derived in Section 2 do not 
change. First, that the retail/super retail market is dominated by 
risky borrowers, which penalizes small safe borrowers. Second, 
that despite the more intense use of information to assess bor-
rower type - now banks keep records on a wider range of borrow-
ers - white information remains private to banks. 
In practice, therefore, the actual use of the screening 
technology in the retail market presupposes limits to competition 
across the retail and middle market segments. These could take 
several forms. For instance, banks may introduce the technology 
while capping the size of the loans extended through the retail 
market, since large loans in this market segment are more likely 
to go to risky borrowers than do small ones. This would make the 
screening technology more attractive if fixed costs are not high, 
but it would only be effective if banks could identify the overall 
debt exposure of borrowers in the financial system. A conse-
quence of this strategy would be to secure a forced clientele for 
29 In this way, while price stability has made use of screening technologies more attractive, fostering 
demand for white information, which private CIRs are seeking to supply and banks learning how to 
use, it has also been the case that banks have started to expand their own information systems to 
absorb clients formerly in the retail segment into their middle-market clientele. 
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the middle market regardless of interest rates and costs in the 
retail segment. Alternatively, it may be the case that making sure 
that a borrower is safe becomes absurdly expensive for small 
loans and banks voluntarily limit the size of the middle market 
from below. Yet another possibility is that also in the retail 
market banks have privileged access to some of the information 
relevant to infer borrow type or have some transaction cost 
advantage vis-à-vis other banks, so that they are able to make a 
non-zero economic profit from lending in that market segment. 
In this case, they would weigh the gains made in the two market 
segments and possibly avoid corner solutions as those described 
above. 
In none of these situations are banks likely to provide to 
other lenders the private white information they have on middle-
market borrowers, for the reasons noted before. 3° This contrasts 
with the results of Pagano and Japelli (1993), who obtained that 
under some circumstances banks might be willing to exchange 
white information on borrowers, even if this reduces their ability 
to extract rents from them. The reason they reach a different 
result is that their model, distinctly from ours, assumes that 
banks earn positive profits even if they have no information 
advantage, because they have a location advantage vis-a-vis other 
banks. So they will trade white information if by doing that they 
can increase location rents in excess of the loss in information 
rents. The existence of location rents seems unrealistic for the 
corporate and middle-markets in Brazil, where all major banks 
operate nationwide, but it may be a reasonable assumption for 
the retail market, in this way helping to explain why banks could 
also extract rents in this market segment and would not want to 
make the screening technology unfeasible by lowering RM "too 
much." 
3.2. The CM Industry in Brazi1 31 
Traditionally, CIRs in Brazil have concentrated their activi-
ties on keeping black lists on borrowers in default, essentially 
with the purpose of enforcement, with borrowers who settle their 
debts having their names cleared from those lists - in fact, CIRs 
have explicit rules requiring participants to drop debtor names 
from those registries upon repayment. Even if creditors do not 
strictly abide to those rules, CIRs are keen to provide debtors with 
facilities for them to do so. 32 And borrowers have strong incentives 
30 It is remarkable, for instance, that although it would make sense for banks to voluntarily share 
information so as to learn the total lending extended by the financial system to each borrower, an 
information that could be instrumental in identifying risky borrowers, nothing was done in that 
direction until mandated by the Central Bank (see next section). 
31 This section partly draws on Pinheiro and Cabral (1998). 
32 For instance, Serasa (see below) has an agency in each state to where borrowers can bring proof of 
debt settlement and get their names out of Serasa's listings. The Retailers Associations also keep a 
window in their offices where borrowers can "clear" their names from the SPC listings (see below). 
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to do so, since inclusion of one's name in any of those lists is in 
general sufficient to exclude him/her from the credit market. 
Although CIRs have in common the emphasis on black 
information, and the fact that they share some of this information, 
they differ with respect to their data sources, their clientele, and 
to how updated and encompassing is their information. The most 
traditional CIR is the Returned Check Register (Cadastro de 
Cheque sem Fundos), which is managed by the Central Bank and 
lists all people who issued unfunded checks, an information 
compulsorily supplied by banks. 33 Regularly updated copies of 
this register are made available to participants and clients of all 
CIRs in Brazil. 
This is the case of the SPC (Credit Protection Service), a 
network of CIRs established at municipal level and run by the lo-
cal Associations of Retailers. The SPC not only facilitates the 
access of retailers to this data, but also collects and distributes 
among its members data on borrowers who are in default on their 
commercial or trading responsibilities with members of the asso-
ciation. These associations also keep a separate record for firms 
in default, but it is the SPC, which carries data on individuals 
only, that is the most used and best known of its black lists. 
Serasa is Brazil's largest profit oriented CIR. Established 
in 1968 by three of Brazil's main national banks, currently all 
medium and large banks are shareholders in the company. As 
the other CIRs, Serasa was created essentially to keep black 
information, and although since the Real Plan it started to also 
offer white information, several of its main products still focus on 
restrictive data. This is the case of Achei and Recheque, two 
related products that provide information on unfunded, can-
celled, stopped, stolen and lost checks. A third product, Concen-
tre, supplies information on protestos (protests), checks with 
insufficient funds, bankruptcies, concordatas (reorganizations), 
legal actions (executive actions, search and seizure actions, Fed-
eral Justice fiscal execution actions), tax debts (with Secretaria 
da Receita Federal, the Brazilian tax authority), and participation 
in bankruptcy processes. 
A fourth important CIR in Brazil is Cadin (Register of 
Defaulters), which was originally created to block access to credit 
from public institutions to firms and individuals who were in 
default either with a public financial institution or in their tax 
obligations. For this reason, originally only public financial ins-
titutions could access the Cadin. With time, access was open to 
all public institutions, in an attempt to enforce payment of all 
types of commercial obligations with public agencies, including 
33 The value of this register for credit analysis stems from the widespread use of checks in commercial 
transactions, a practice inherited from the high inflation period, which was sustained after 
stabilization by the use of predated checks as a major source of retail credit. It is estimated that 
about 60 percent of all checks issued in Brazil are predated. 
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state enterprises in many different sectors (e.g., public utilities, 
gas stations, etc.). It stayed, however, out of reach to private 
creditors. Soon, the list of debtors in default increased so much, 
and the reliability of the information it kept deteriorated so 
tremendously, that the law forbidding public banks to lend to 
firms in Cadin was revoked, so that currently public banks use 
Cadin as one more source of black information on borrowers. 
The growing demand for information on borrowers since 
the mid-nineties has attracted new players to the Brazilian CIR 
industry. Equifax, a large American company, bought SCI, a 
smaller competitor of Serasa, and credit rating agencies such as 
S&P's established local offices. It has also encouraged already 
established CIRs to diversify their services towards the supply of 
white information. This is the case of Serasa's Fica, Relato and 
Credit Bureau. 
Fica is a data bank that provides information on key 
determinants of a firm's performance and an indicative evaluation 
of its credit risk. Its data comes mostly from banks: when a bank 
accepts a new business customer it is supposed to pass to Serasa 
the data collected on the loan application. Information can also 
be obtained with the firm itself - firms usually attend requests for 
information from Serasa. An offspring of Fica is Fica Avancada, 
which supplies the firm's: (a) legal identification, addresses, etc.; 
(b) balance sheets, income statements and internal cash genera-
tion, including both their current values and the position on 
December 31 of the two previous years; (c) working capital needs, 
its variation, cash balance and operational cash flow; (d) sources 
and uses of funds; (e) main economic and financial indicators; 
and (f) a brief analysis of the recent performance of the firm, with 
an indicative evaluation of the credit risk. 
Relato gives, in addition to the data provided by Achei/Re-
cheque and Concentre (see above), information on the payment 
history of the firm, obtained from suppliers and banks. It includes 
the name and legal identification of the firm's 5 main suppliers, 
the total number of suppliers along with the length of their rela-
tionship with the firm, and, for the 13 previous months: (a) the 
number of consultations about that firm, with information on the 
date and name of the firms responsible for the 4 last consult-
ations; (b) information on due payment values classified as "on 
time" and by intervals of delay, together with the value of cash 
payments and total of payments for the month; (d) the evolution 
of the firm's debt to suppliers; (e) the date and value of the last 
purchase, of the largest invoice and of the largest cumulate value 
of purchases; and (1) due and not paid financial obligations. It also 
gives the consolidated position of bank and supplier credit. 
Credit Bureau includes positive information on individuals 
obtained from and used by credit card, financial, leasing, factor-
ing and insurance companies, as well as other organizations in 
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any way related to individual credit. To receive the information 
firms have to agree to provide feedback into the system (reciproc-
ity regime). Credit Bureau includes: (a) name, date and place of 
birth, spouse's and parent's names, address, telephone, time at 
current address, if residence is owned or rented, main occupation, 
employer and time at current job; (b) negative information such 
as delays in paying credit obligations, legal actions, unfunded or 
irregular checks, etc.; (c) number and dates of recent credit 
consultations; (d) occupation, professional address, schooling, 
other addresses and professional activities, existing financial 
obligations and payment behavior; (e) outstanding credit obliga-
tions; and (f) credit scoring, calculated using risk predictive 
models. 
Another important new development has been the creation 
of the CRC (Central Register of Credit Risk), a CIR managed by 
the Department of Bank Supervision (Departamento de Fiscali-
zacao) of the Central Bank. Every month financial institutions 
must inform to the CRC the value of their loan exposures with all 
clients to whom they have extended credit (including guarantees 
and credit allowances) totaling R$ 20,000 or more (see Table 2.1). 
For borrowers with total liabilities of more than R$ 50,000 they 
must also rate each loan operation according to a nine-tier rating 
system defined by the Central Bank. Each institution is free to 
use its own methods to assess the credit risk of each loan, but it 
must respect minimum standards established by the Central 
Bank. 34 To classify loans banks are expected to take into account 
the economic and financial health of the debtor and of the loan's 
guarantor, as well as characteristics of the loan itself. Financial 
institutions have up to the 20th of the month to inform balances 
at the end of the previous month. 
Information in the CRC is made available at different levels 
to different "customers", but not to the public at large, which the 
law does not allow. Financial institutions access the CRC through 
a computer system (Sisbacen), where they learn the consolidated 
value of the debt of fu -ms and individuals and the number of 
institutions that informed credit operations with each debtor. 35 
 This information may be shared with other companies in the 
34 The system created by the Central Bank has 9 rating categories - AA, A, B, C, D, E. F, G, H. Loans 
with delays between 15 and 30 days can be rated at most a B, those between 31 and 60 days a C, 
and in this way successively until category H, which is mandatory for all loans with delays of more 
than 180 days. For loans with maturities of more than 3 years the permissible delays are twice as 
large. 
35 Even though the CRC allows banks to learn little more than the total debt of a loan applicant, the 
importance of the CRC to overcome interbank information asymmetries should not be overlooked. 
The simple fact that a firm has managed to secure credit is in itself revealing about its actual 
probability of default. As time passes by, financial institutions will also be able to learn about the 
actual payment history of these firms, further reducing information asymmetries. Moreover, the 
Central Bank is planning to increase the access of banks to information about borrowers. Yet, it is 
remarkable, and telling about Brazil's CIRs, that according to Brazil's Central Bank "today the 
Central de Risco de Crddito is mainly seen as a source of negative information" (Banco Central, Nova 
Central de Risco de Credito, presentation made at the Brazilian Federation of Banks, November, 9, 
2000). 
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financial institution's conglomerate. To consult a client's record, 
the financial institution needs to obtain written authorization 
from the client, which is usually done when he applies for credit. 
The Central Bank charges a fee for the access to the Sisbacen, 
but not for the information in the CRC. Anyone can ask the 
Central Bank for information on all individual debts reported by 
financial institutions in his or her name, including the identifica-
tion of the institutions and the value of the debts. However, if the 
debtor disagrees with the information in the CRC, it is up to him 
or her to go to the financial institution and ask for a correction. 
4. Use of Credit Information in Bank Regulation and 
Supervision 
The very high inflation prevailing in Brazil until June 1994 
reduced the actual information contained in banks' balance 
sheets and in this way complicated bank supervision and regu-
lation. But, at the same time, it made them less necessary, by 
allowing even poorly run banks to be profitable. Moreover, it 
discouraged credit activity, particularly by private banks, so there 
was little credit risk to speak of. This encouraged a policy of 
regulatory forbearance, which was especially pronounced in the 
case of state-owned banks. When inflation came down, the inade-
quacy of those practices was evidenced by the insolvency of a 
number of banks. It was not by chance, therefore, that the 
reduction in inflation rates coincided with an effort to improve 
supervision and regulation. 
Prudential bank regulation in Brazil relies on standard 
instruments. Entry is regulated through rules concerning mini-
mum capital requirements and good reputation of owners and 
managers, and is determined case by case by the Central Bank 
(and the President of the Republic in the case of foreign banks). 
In recent years, decisions about entry have been tuned to facilitate 
the privatization of state banks and the purchase and assumption 
of banks with solvency problems. In this process, foreign banks 
were given greater access to the market. 
Banks are also required to keep both minimum absolute 
levels of capital (that vary according to type, size and region) and 
capital-asset ratios that follow the rules established by the Basle 
Agreement (Cooke ratios), adopted in Brazil in August 1994 
(Central Bank Resolution 2099). According to these, banks' own 
capital (net worth) has to be equal to or larger than 11% of their 
risk-weighted assets, plus 20% of the credit risk in swap opera-
tions. These values have been in place since November 27, 1997, 
when in the aftermath of the Asian Crisis the Central Bank raised 
capital requirements. 
Tpxtn nnrn IlLsrzicAyin n 9 AR 	 39 
Solvency regulations also include the requirement of mini-
mum loan loss provisions. These reflect the credit risk of each 
loan, as classified in the nine categories (AA to H) used in the CRC 
(see Section 3.2). These provisions, in the case of loans of 
R$ 50,000 and above, are of 0.5%, 1%, 3%, 10%, 30%, 50%, 70% 
and 100% for each category from A to H, respectively. For loans 
below R$ 50,000 similar provisions apply, but risk classification 
may reflect only the extent of payment delay, although banks are 
free to adopt more rigorous criteria at their discretion. These 
rules, introduced in 2000, are more stringent and detailed than 
the ones in place before. 
The Central Bank also restricts the composition of banks' 
loan portfolios. These restrictions are intended both to guarantee 
a minimum level of diversification and to prevent connected 
lending. A cap equivalent to 25% of the bank's net worth applies 
to all lending to individual borrowers. Lending to owners, man-
agers and their relatives is forbidden. 
Deposit insurance, established after the post-Real Plan 
bank crisis, is managed by the FGC (Deposit Guarantee Fund), a 
private nonprofit organization that guarantees deposits and cer-
tain financial investments up to R$ 20,000 per depositor in case 
of bankruptcy or closure by the Central Bank. 36 This insurance 
covers demand and term deposits, savings accounts, letters of 
exchange, real estate and mortgage letters (tetras imobiliarias and 
letras hipotecarias) issued or guaranteed by the financial institu-
tion. All financial institutions, except for credit cooperatives, 
participate in the FGC, paying a monthly flat premium of 0,025% 
on the value of its outstanding balances on the accounts insured. 
Although the rules are well spelled out and relatively 
standard, their enforcement has not always been as strict as one 
might have wished, especially in the case of state banks, although 
that too began to change in recent years. For instance, the closure 
of two state banks with a negative net worth - Banespa and Caixa 
EconOmica Federal - was avoided through the expediency of 
delaying the publication of their balance sheets until they could 
be "restructured." The two largest federal commercial banks were 
given special grace periods to adjust their capital requirements 
to minimum regulatory standards. Another earlier example is 
provided by the lax application of the limits on connected len-
ding. 37 The resolution of some insolvent banks, prior to the 
creation of the FGC, also revealed a "too big to fail" policy, and a 
36 The value of RS 20.000 was applied in all cases of banks liquidated before the FGC was established. 
37 A Central Bank document describing the Program for the Restructuring of the Public State Financial 
System (Proes) observes that "like the private banks, official banks have also been forced to adjust 
to the new reality of a stable economy. However, in this case, their problems are more complex. not 
the least due to the excess of loans extended to controlling shareholders (in this case, the government 
of the respective state) and related firms, in disagreement with a basic prudential rule of the financial 
system." 
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practice of de facto complete insurance by the government of all 
creditors of large banks. 38 
Moreover, although prudential regulation was changed in 
recent years to raise capital requirements and make them more 
sensitive to borrower and loan risk, these changes did not alter 
its almost exclusive reliance on backward-looking information, 
mostly obtained from banks' balance sheets and debtor perform-
ance. Therefore, even though provisions for loan losses are based 
on a rating system that in principle reflects lenders' forward 
expectations regarding the risk of each loan, it is not clear why 
banks should in practice be more conservative than required by 
the minimum standards imposed by the Central Bank, which 
depend only on the duration of defaults (Section 3.2). On the 
contrary, banks will be subject to strategic biases and will tend 
to underestimate the probability of default, to lower their capital 
requirements and increase the goodwill of their clients, a behavior 
that probably explains why the CRC continues to be "mainly seen 
as a source of negative information." 
Little information outside that collected from balance 
sheets, supervision visits or the CRC is used in bank regulation 
and supervision. In particular little use is made of credit infor-
mation collected or generated by CIRs. The only noteworthy 
exception seems to be the use of black information gathered by 
private CIRs (i.e., the borrowers' cadastro), which the Central 
Bank takes into consideration when analyzing a bank's credit 
portfolio in its on-site supervision. 
This situation, although on a par with the way prudential 
regulation works in most other countries, contrasts with what the 
literature recommends, in particular with the need to make it 
more forward looking and risk sensitive. 39 Credit information can 
be used to adapt four of the above regulatory instruments in that 
way: reserves for loan losses, capital adequacy requirements, 
insurance premiums and closure rules. Two of these instruments 
have received most of the attention in the literature: risk-adjusted 
deposit insurance premiums and capital adequacy ratios. 
The idea to use risk-sensitive deposit insurance premiums 
goes back to the view that the main purpose of bank regulation 
is to protect small, largely unsophisticated depositors. 4 In the 
presence of limited liability, a bank's capital structure gives an 
incentive for owner-managers to follow an investment policy that 
38 State banks, in particular. are perceived as de facto fully insured by the public sector. This explains 
why. despite showing default rates much above the industry's average, state banks experience an 
increase in their shares of total deposits when depositors fear for the health of the financial system. 
39 See, for instance, Dewatripont and Tirole (1994), Freixas and Rochet (1997) and BIS (1999 and 2001). 
A possible reason for this contrast is the tendency noted by Rochet (1999) for "prudential authorities 
themselves (to) insist more on the prevention of systemic risk, a topic that has received so far less 
attention from theoreticians." 
40 Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) call this justification for bank regulation the "representation hypothe-
sis." 
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carries more risk than its depositors would like to. This is 
explained by the fact that equity holders typically benefit more in 
favorable states (the project succeeds) than depositors, whereas 
the two groups share losses proportionately in very bad states 
(the bank closes down). A flat rate deposit insurance premium, 
even if actuarially balanced, does not correct these perverse 
incentives. But this could be done, under certain conditions, 
through risk-adjusted deposit insurance premiums. In fact, Ro-
chet (1992) shows that if the objective of bank owners is to 
maximize the market value of their future profits, risk-based 
deposit insurance is the only way to prevent them to choose very 
risky portfolios. However, there are both conceptual and practical 
problems to implementing fairly priced deposit insurance.'" One 
of them is how to measure risk and determine risk premiums in 
an efficient and timely way. 42 
This perhaps explains the general preference of regulators 
to discourage excessive risk-taking by banks through the use of 
minimum capital requirements. These not only provide a cushion 
for bank losses, but also increase owners' stake when taking risk, 
encouraging more conservative decisions. For this regulation to 
be efficient, though, it is necessary that capital requirements be 
risk sensitive, that is, that the average cost of capital goes up 
when risk increases. 43 The best known effort to adapt capital 
adequacy rules to reflect credit risk is the Cooke ratio included in 
the Basle Accords of 1988. The Cooke ratio has been criticized, 
however, not only for disregarding other types of risk, but also for 
not adequately weighting different types of credit risk [Dewatri-
pont and Tirole (1994)1. A 1999 report of the Basle Committee on 
Banking Supervision, while reinforcing the view that minimum 
regulatory capital requirements, adjusted for credit risk, should 
remain the main approach to promote safety and soundness in 
the financial system, acknowledges that "[t]le current risk 
weighting of assets results, at best, in a crude measure of 
economic risk, primarily because degrees of credit risk exposure 
are not sufficiently calibrated as to adequately differentiate be-
tween borrowers' differing default risks" [BIS (1999, p. 9)]." 
Freixas and Rochet (1997) suggest that a better way to make 
banks' capital-asset ratios dependent on their asset risk is to use 
borrowers' ratings, produced by independent agencies, to weight 
their assets. This idea is incorporated in the standardized ap- 
41 For a summary of the main issues, see Freixas and Rochet (1997). 
42 Commenting on proposals to reform the American deposit insurance system, Benston and Kaufman 
(1997, pp. 143-4) go a step further to argue that: in theory, it is clear that risk-based insurance 
premiums would, at least partially, discourage institutions from following a high-risk loan strategy. 
But as a practical matter. how the risks and premiums would be determined was unclear, and, by 
themselves, risk-based premiums did not address the problem of regulators who were often slow, 
whether because of personal inclination or institutional pressure, to take steps that would address 
financially troubled institutions." 
43 Rochet (1992) shows, in addition, that because of limited liability solvency regulations should also 
require a minimum absolute level of own capital. 
44 Moreover, risk weights also favor lending to the public sector. 
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proach included in the New Basel Capital Accord put forward by 
the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision {BIS (2001)1. 
Some countries - e.g. New Zealand, Chile and Argentina -
also rely on credit ratings produced by government auditors 
and/or by private agencies to directly increase banks' sensitive-
ness to risk exposure, requiring the publication of their own credit 
ratings. The expectation is that this increases market discipline 
by making depositors and other creditors more aware of the risk 
carried out by their banks (see Goldstein and Turner, 1996). 45 
Although the idea that prudential regulation can be im-
proved by increasing the costs to banks of taking risk is well 
accepted, very little in that direction has been done in practice. 46 
 The main reason for that is the difficulty of finding the adequate 
information to use for that purpose. Rochet (1992) argues that for 
capital-asset ratios to be effective in controlling excessive risk the 
weights used in their computation have to be proportional to the 
systemic risk of the assets (their betas). But remarks, in a latter 
article (Rochet, 1999), that "an important peculiarity of bank 
loans, which constitute the bulk of the assets of most banks, is 
that their true value is a private information of the bank that has 
granted the loan." A second-best solution is then to weight loans 
using each borrower's credit rating. But that leaves unanswered 
the question of how to deal with unrated borrowers. Moreover, 
the value of credit ratings as leading indicators of default are still 
a matter of controversy (see Goldstein and Turner, 1996). 
The Brazilian credit market illustrates well the practical 
difficulties and limitations of these recommendations. As pointed 
out in Section 2, for most borrowers, and a large share of the 
credit market, there is no public information to assess loan risk. 
The only exception is corporate borrowers, for which independent 
ratings are in general available. In fact, large firms are the 
prototype borrower addressed in the new BIS framework: they are 
rated by different institutions, including the most important 
credit-rating agencies and possibly the large banks with which 
they operate, and these ratings can be used directly to weigh their 
loans when computing capital requirements. The problem in this 
case would be how to choose among different ratings, but the 
empirical evidence suggests that for large non-financial firms the 
divergence in independent ratings tend to be relatively small 
[Morgan (1997)). 
45 In principle, credit information could also be used to inform the decision to close or intervene in a 
bank, allowing the Central Bank to resolve the bank while it is still moderately capitalized. In practice, 
however, it could be legally difficult to intervene in a bank that is economically insolvent but still 
has a positive net worth. Adopting such procedure would likely demand changes in the law, possibly 
making intervention less discretionary, along the lines of the rules-based intervention procedures 
of the SEIR (Structured Early Intervention and Resolution) proposal (see Benston and Kaufman, 
1997). 
46 For instance. the risk-sensitive deposit insurance premiums adopted in the US in 1991, when the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Improvement Act (FDICIA) was enacted, uses a bank's capital-asset ratio 
to measure its risk [Benston and Kaufman (1997)). 
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A more complicated issue is how to incorporate into pru-
dential regulation the risk of loans to mid-size companies for 
which there is no rating available. The problem is not only one of 
the quantity of firms, but that much of the relevant information 
for analyzing the credit risk of these borrowers arises from 
bilateral, long-term relationships that they keep with their banks, 
which is not disclosed either to the Central Bank or to private 
CIRs. In developing countries, balance sheets of many of these 
firms are utterly unreliable - even in some of the few cases in 
which they are audited by independent firms - and often do not 
to reflect the actual financial health of the firm. 47 
Thus, one the most important features of the New Basel 
Capital Accord proposal is the relevance attributed to information 
private to banks to assess credit risk: "a key element of the 
proposed revisions to the 1988 Accord is a greater emphasis on 
banks' own assessment of the risks to which they are exposed in 
the calculation of regulatory capital charges" (BIS (2001, p. 1)). 
In this way, the proposal advocates the adoption in bank regula-
tion of an "evolutionary approach" in which more sophisticated 
banks would be given more responsibility in determining their 
own capital requirements. The main element of this approach 
would be the use of banks' internal ratings to assess the risk of 
their credit portfolios. This approach would be complemented by 
a strengthening of the supervisory authority and greater disclo-
sure requirements "to ensure that market participants can better 
understand banks' risk profiles and the adequacy of their capital 
positions." 
These recommendations are in line with the results of this 
paper, in particular with the fact that in developing countries like 
Brazil banks have a monopoly over much of the information 
necessary to assess credit risk. Two other results of our analysis 
help to shed light on the issue of prudential regulation. First, as 
the cost of capital to banks (R) continues to decline (in December 
2000 it was still 12%), market size will expand, but so will default 
ratios, signaling a deterioration in the quality of credit. Moreover, 
lower interest rates will not diminish the importance of market 
segmentation or the share of total credit channeled through the 
middle market. Bank profits will go up, with a higher volume of 
lending, but profit rates will come down, 48 likely reducing the ratio 
of charter values to own capital. Second, more access to credit 
information, through the CRC and the strengthening of the CIR 
industry, a continued upgrading of banks' credit decision process, 
47 The Argentine Central Bank tries to mitigate this problem using the interest rate charged by banks 
in individual operations as a proxy of credit risk, using these to generate an Indicator of Credit Risk, 
used in computing minimum capital requirements. Escude (1999) shows that under certain 
conditions interest rates are a good proxy to the systemic risk of loans. The shortcoming of this 
procedure is that it encourages banks to lower reported interest rates, using other means to 
remunerate their loans (e.g. minimum interest-free deposit balances). 
48 This projection is consistent with Demirgfig-Kunt and Huizinga's (1999) empirical finding that a 
larger ratio of bank assets to GDP lead to lower bank profits and interest margins. 
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and a more intense lending activity by foreign banks, 49 will make 
credit markets more competitive, or at least more constestable, 
significantly reducing bank profits, as shown in Section 3. Fur-
thermore, more competition and the introduction of better screen-
ing mechanisms may actually lead to an expansion of the 
middle-market, with banks reacting to competition by expanding 
the spectrum of borrowers on whom they keep their own infor-
mation registers. That means that although more information on 
borrowers should be generated, the proportion of white informa-
tion that is private to banks should rise. 
These results lead, in turn, to two conclusions. One, that 
making prudential regulation more risk sensitive will depend on 
the regulator' s ability to extract unbiased ratings from banks. 
The challenge, then, is for the Central Bank to introduce incen-
tives that lead banks to improve the quality of their credit analysis 
process, so as to be able to correctly identify safe borrowers; and 
to correctly inform the Central Bank about their ratings for each 
loan. These could be done, for instance, by increasing capital 
requirements of banks that consistently underestimate the risk of 
their credit portfolios, as revealed by ex-post debtor performance. 50 
Two, that stiffer competition and lower profits will encourage 
banks to take higher risks, making the need for adequate prudential 
regulation even more necessary. As noted by Riordan (1993), the 
effort dedicated to select good projects depends on the probability 
of being chosen to finance the project and on the expected return 
from doing this. Both are reduced when competition increases, "so 
more competition might harm market performance, even as prices 
draw closer to marginal cost." Keeley (1990) argues that an increase 
in competition resulting from changes in the institutional environ-
ment explains the reduction in capital-asset ratios and the increase 
in asset risk that eventually led to the S&Ls and bank crises of the 
eighties in the USA. Lower profits, in turn, cause charter values to 
decline, mitigating an endogenous deterrent to excessive risk tak-
ing. In this way, Weisbrod et al. (1992) show that a reduction in 
charter values has contributed to increase risk-taking by banks 
in the USA and Japan. Besanko and Thakor (1993) use a similar 
argument to reason that changes in the competition environment, 
by reducing the importance of relationship banking, and of the 
valuable private information it generates, lowers bank charter 
values and encourages risky lending. 51 
49 It is noteworthy that while the participation of foreign banks in total bank assets rose from 12.8% 
in 1997 to 27.5% in 2000, their share in total lending went from 11.7% to 17.8% (Valor, February 
13, 2001, p. C1). 
50 It is less straightforward how to factor into prudential regulation the available information about 
retail risks, for which not even the banks keep private information. The difficulty in this case is 
composed by the fact that only banks can truly differentiate between a middle- and a retail market 
borrower: for outsiders the lack of information is the same in both cases, and only the value of their 
debts is an indicative of which is which. 
51 In fact, some authors go as far as advocating that prudential regulation should limit bank competition 
to discourage banks from investing in excessively risky assets (see, for instance, Matutes and Vives, 
2000, and Hellman, Murdock and Stiglitz, 2000). 
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5. Final Remarks 
That the information generated by close banking relation-
ships is valuable to creditors in assessing borrower risk has long 
been acknowledged in the literature. This paper departed from 
this conclusion to argue that, in an institutional environment 
marked by poor accounting practices and pervasive tax evasion, 
the value of such information will be even higher, possibly to the 
point of segmenting the credit market. Segmentation causes 
banks to charge different interest rates and use different amounts 
of information when deciding whether or not to extend a loan to 
borrowers who pose the same risk. Segmentation is a reality in 
Brazil, where the loan market is divided into the retail (consumer 
credit and small business), middle and corporate markets. 
Our comparative static exercises, based on a simple model 
with interbank asymmetry of information, showed that segmen-
tation is robust to the sort of change that has characterized 
Brazilian credit markets in recent years, in particular to the 
lowering of interest rates, and therefore is unlikely to go away in 
the near future. These exercises also showed, however, that 
market segmentation does not substantially affect the overall 
volume or the quality of credit. By treating debtors whose type is 
unknown to all banks essentially as risky borrowers, banks limit 
the volume of bad credits and keep the market "relatively safe." 
Thus, the main negative consequences of market segmentation 
are the high interest rates imposed on small safe borrowers and 
the distorting effects of banks' monopoly power in the middle 
market, where borrowers are "informationally captured." In this 
way, although participants in the middle and corporate markets 
tend to pose similar risks, the former pay higher interest rates, 
with the difference reflecting the rents extracted by banks for their 
information advantage. 
Segmentation causes the credit decision process to differ 
considerably according to borrower type. For loans to consumers 
and to small business, the general trend since price stabilization 
has been towards the introduction of a highly decentralized 
process of credit management. According to this, all loan requests 
are treated automatically by statistical methods, based on infor-
mation supplied by the client and/or available from public re-
cords, with a decision being rapidly reached at the branch level. 
The discriminating variable in these cases is the borrowers' credit 
records, which are heavily biased towards weighing the impor-
tance of restrictive information. Thus, black information, pro-
vided mainly by credit information bureaus (CIRs), is probably 
the most relevant and often the only data used in the credit 
decision process in the retail market, which comprises as much 
as 80% of all loans in some banks. 
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The importance of negative information in credit analysis 
decreases as the size and complexity of the loan operation in-
crease. Its role is therefore less important in the so-called 
middle-market, which seems to be the most profitable lending 
activity in Brazil. In this segment banks rely more on their own 
data, collected through balance-sheet analysis and on-site visits 
to firms. Some financial institutions maintain their own in-house 
credit rating facility, with the more aggressive banks almost 
disregarding the usual published balance-sheet data, on account 
of their misrepresentation of the actual economic and financial 
situation of companies. Instead, they replace the formal account-
ing information with an internal information system, used to trace 
changes in companies' financial conditions. One important ele-
ment of such system is the monitoring of the liquidity of the 
borrowers' receivables, since the latter are the most commonly 
accepted collateral for business loans in Brazil. 
In the case of loans to large firms, information provided by 
CIRs has a limited role in the credit decision process, which relies 
mainly on the research and analysis conducted by the lender 
itself. Audited balance sheets and other financial statements are 
more valuable in such cases, because they are more reliable than 
for smaller firms. In particular, many of these borrowers, being 
public corporations, with shares or bonds negotiated in domestic 
or international financial markets, provide investors with a regu-
lar flow of information on their economic and financial situation. 
Lending in the corporate market accounts for a large proportion 
of the total credit portfolio of Brazilian banks, though its client-
base is very small and spreads rather narrow. 
Because on average banks profit more from operations in 
the middle market than in the corporate and retail segments, and 
since these profits depend on their privileged access to informa-
tion on borrower creditworthiness, they have no incentives to 
exchange white information with other banks. That is the case, 
for instance, of the data and analysis of borrowers' creditworthi-
ness gathered by internal information systems, which remain 
private to the bank and are not shared with credit bureaus. 
Therefore, segmentation implicates a limited role for CIRs: essen-
tially, maintaining black information and providing good ratings 
for safe borrowers in the corporate sector. 
Banks will be in general willing to share black information, 
to a large extent with the purpose of enforcement - i.e., to increase 
the likelihood that defaulters settle their debts. The enforcement 
incentives of black lists will be the strongest in the retail market, 
which is also the segment in which their information content will 
be the most valuable for the credit decision process. In a seg-
mented credit market, the use of black lists as an enforcement 
mechanism should extend to the willingness of lenders to exclude 
borrowers from these lists if they settle their debts, since this will 
increase their incentives to repay, while doing little harm to 
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creditors, since the marginal gain from information in these lists 
is small, even if borrower type is persistent through time. 
These results from our model are largely consistent with 
the way the CIR industry operates in Brazil. In this way, through 
its relatively long history, Brazilian CIRs have been characterized 
essentially by the maintenance of black lists on defaulters, play-
ing the dual role of informing creditors and encouraging defaul-
ters to settle their debts, so as to have their names erased from 
them. Once a credit relationship has been established, informa-
tion provided by CIRs becomes useful also for monitoring the 
borrower's financial situation, i.e., to learn about the occurrence 
of events that might lead to default. In this way, both upgrades 
and downgrades in the borrower's creditworthiness can be antici-
pated by monitoring changes in his/her economic fortunes as 
recorded in those registries. 
We showed that introduction of better screening technolo-
gies or a greater availability of white information in the retail 
market may change the credit market in one of two possible ways. 
If accurate and cheap, this technology will make the retail market 
more competitive, possibly to the extent that segmentation will 
be greatly reduced. But banks are expected to react to stiffer 
competition from the retail market by reducing interest rates in 
the middle market, in this way securing some profits. Because 
they have access to privileged information, arising from their 
banking relationship with borrowers, they will likely outcompete 
the screening technology. Still, by making credit markets more 
contestable, an environment that facilitates introduction of those 
technologies will pressure interest rates downwards and contrib-
ute to expand market size. Because segmentation will tend to 
damp down the expansion of private CIRs, public intervention 
may be necessary if possibilities in this area are to be fully 
explored. Strengthening of the Central Register of Credit Risk 
(CRC) is likely to be an important step in that direction. 
The end of the high inflation in mid-1994 exposed the 
deficiencies of bank supervision in Brazil, and triggered a process 
of reform that has produced better and more stringent regulation, 
particularly regarding minimum capital requirements. But these 
changes did not alter the almost exclusive reliance of regulation 
on backward-looking information, mostly obtained from banks' 
balance sheets and debtor performance. This situation, although 
on a par with the way prudential regulation works in most other 
countries, contrasts with what the literature recommends, in 
particular with the need to make regulation more forward looking 
and risk sensitive. Credit information can be used to adapt four 
of the above regulatory instruments in that way: reserves for loan 
losses, capital adequacy requirements, insurance premiums and 
closure rules. Two of these instruments have received most of the 
attention in the literature: risk-adjusted deposit insurance pre-
miums and capital adequacy ratios. 
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Although there are both conceptual and practical problems 
to implementing such policies, one of them being the difficulty of 
regulators to properly and timely measure risk, this seems an 
alternative the Central Bank may wish to consider as a way to 
improve bank regulation. In particular, there is room to expand 
the amount of white information available to banks and regula-
tors to analyze credit risk. An effort to improve accounting 
practices seems especially worthwhile, for its implications regard-
ing market competition and greater access of regulators to infor-
mation. CIRs may provide a useful way to organize this 
information, and regulators should consider the possibility of 
using CIRs more intensely. CIR ratings for corporate borrowers 
are a possible means to improve the quality of risk assessment in 
the CRC. 
The reason why risk measurement poses such a difficulty 
to regulators stems from the fact that the true value of most of a 
bank's credits is private information for the bank itself. It makes 
sense, therefore, that the BIS proposal for reforming the 1988 
Basel Capital Accord stresses the relevance of information private 
to banks to assess credit risk, advocating that more sophisticated 
banks should assume greater responsibility in determining their 
own capital requirements. The main element of this approach 
would be the use of banks' internal ratings to assess the risk of 
their credit portfolios. 
These recommendations are in line with the results of this 
paper, in particular with the fact that in developing countries like 
Brazil banks have a monopoly over much of the information 
necessary to assess credit risk. Two other results of our analysis 
help to shed light on the issue of prudential regulation. First, as 
the cost of capital to banks continues to decline, market size will 
expand, but so will default ratios, signaling a deterioration in the 
quality of credit. Bank profits will go up, due to a higher volume 
of lending, but profit rates will come down, likely reducing the 
ratio of charter values to own capital. Second, more access to 
credit information, a continued upgrading of banks' credit deci-
sion process, and a rising participation of foreign banks in lending 
will make credit markets more competitive, or at least more 
constestable, reducing bank profits. Stiffer competition and lower 
profits will encourage banks to take higher risks, making the need 
for adequate prudential regulation even more necessary. 
Second, we showed that if screening in the retail market 
is not sufficiently efficient to allow the retail segment to overtake 
the middle market, the result of competition may be less, rather 
than more publicly available information. That is, financial insti-
tutions operating in the middle market may react to stiffer 
competition from the retail market by lowering spreads and in 
this way enlarging the coverage of the middle market. This would 
cause a large volume of the information generated by banks on 
borrowers' creditworthiness private to them individually, making 
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it more difficult for others, including the Central Bank, to assess 
credit risk. As a major part of the overall credit in the economy is 
and will continue to be extended through the middle market, the 
Central Bank should devise mechanisms to encourage banks to 
improve their credit analysis and provide unbiased estimators of 
the credit risk associated with their loans. A possible means to 
do that would be through higher capital requirements or deposit 
insurance premiums for banks that consistently underestimate 
the risk of their loan portfolios. 
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Annexes 
Annex A 
Banking Expenditures with External Credit 
Information 
This annex presents empirical evidence on how much 
banks in Brazil spend to acquire external credit information on 
borrowers. Although we were not able to get data separated 
according to borrower type (corporate, middle and retail), the 
figures presented below give an indication of the magnitudes 
involved. 
Our data covers a selected sample of 46 banks, out of a 
total of 220 banks operating in Brazil in December 1999. The 
sample is not random, in the sense that it was chosen to represent 
best the banks most heavily engaged in credit granting activities. 
43 out of those 46 banks are private-owned, so the focus is on 
credit decisions by private institutions, but the two largest federal 
banks and one local state-owned bank are also in the sample. 
This comprises large, medium and small retail banks, selected 
according to factors such as value of loans and number of 
branches; investment banks, for which credit is not the main 
operating activity; and financial institutions owned by automobile 
manufacturers, which basically finance the sale of vehicles as-
sembled by their parent company. The sample includes domestic 
and foreign institutions. 
For each of those banks, we collected data on monthly 
expenditures (in reais) with credit information provided by 
Serasa, which as noted before is the most important CIR in Brazil. 
The time frame comprised the 18-month interval between Janu-
ary 1998 and June 1999. Table A.1 provides basic descriptive 
statistics on expenditures for each semester, showing that this 
variable presents a significant sample variance, as indicated 
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Table A.1 
Total Expenditures on Serasa Credit Information 
(monthly averages, in R$ thousand) 
1998-1 199841 1999-1 
Monthly average 979.6 1.074.0 987.4 
Standard-deviation 1,207.7 1,280.9 1,261.7 
Coeff. of variation (%) 123.3 112.5 127.8 
Minimum value 12.7 41.5 17.8 
Maximum value 4.087.8 4.194.1 4.507.3 
Share of the 5 largest (%) 38 35 38 
Source: Based on data provided by Serasa. 
among others by the difference between the maximum and the 
minimum expenditures per bank in each semester. The Table also 
indicates that expenditures are relatively concentrated, with the 
5 banks with largest expenditures (roughly 11% of the sample) 
answering for between 35% and 38% of the total. 
Obviously, size is likely to be an important reason why 
some banks spend more on CIR services than others. To examine 
this possibility, monthly average expenditures with Serasa's serv-
ices were divided by the credit stock outstanding at the end of 
those three semesters. This ratio indicates the amount of money 
spent on buying external information for each real of the stock of 
loans prevailing at the end of the semester. 52 Table A.2 shows 
the data above normalized by the stock of credit outstanding 
at the end of each semester, except for the first period, in which 
the denominator is the total credit outstanding at the beginning 
of the period, that is to say, December 1997. In general, banks 
spent less than R$ 1.00 in buying credit information for each R$ 
1,000.00 of credit registered in their balance sheets. As in Table 
C.1, there are large cross-bank differences in expenditures with 
CIR information, ranging from less than one cent of real to around 
R$ 5.00 for each R$ 1,000.00 of total credit. 53 
Is there a relationship between the amount of loans 
granted by each bank and its expenditure/credit ratio? That is to 
say, do banks with large stocks of loans spend more or less than 
small banks per unit of credit to buy information on their borrow-
ers? A simple correlation test yields a negative - -0.170 and 
-0.179, respectively, for the first and second periods - but not 
statistically significant coefficient. Therefore, for our sample there 
52 Obviously, this indicator has all the shortcomings associated with a ratio between a flow and a stock 
variable. However, as data on bank lending flows is not available in Brazil, we had to stick to the 
stock variable as a proxy for credit flows. 
53 The number of observations drops from 46 in the first two periods to 40 in the last due to 
mergers/acquisitions in the private banking market, and to lack of information on credit figures for 
3 institutions. The descriptive statistics for the last semester, rather similar to those for the two 
previous periods, suggest that this change in the sample did not compromise comparisons across 
semesters. 
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Table A.2 
Monthly Expenditures on External Information for each 
R$ 1,000 of Credit Balances (in R$) 
1998-1 1998-11 1999-1 
Monthly average 0.82 0.82 0.76 
Standard-deviation 1,07 1.21 1,12 
Coeff. of variation (%) 130.5 147.8 147.4 
Minimum value 0.002 0.002 0.001 
Maximum value 4.10 5.40 6.00 
No. of observations 46 46 40 
Source: Based on data provided by Serasa. 
is no direct relationship between bank size and the ratio of 
expenditures with outside (Serasa) credit information to the stock 
of credit. 
In addition to size, bank type may be another cause for the 
large dispersion in values shown in Table A.2. To examine this 
possibility, we calculated the average and standard deviation of 
the ratio of expenditures with Serasa credit information to the 
stock of credit separately for 5 groups of banks. The first two are 
specialized banks associated with the car-assembly industry, the 
main activity of which is financing the sale of motor vehicles, 
trucks and motorcycles, either to dealers or to the final consumer; 
and "multiple" banks centered mostly on wholesale businesses 
typical of investment banks, which do not require large branch 
network and personnel, such as capital market operations, secu-
rities trading and corporate finance. The last three groups are 
composed of ret-)il banks, which in general are not specialized 
financial institutions, dealing with individuals and firms of all 
economic sizes. The latter differ according to their size, number 
and location of branches, and core business, and are hence 
classified into three categories: large, medium and small. 
Table A.3 shows the ratio of expenditures with credit 
information to the stock of loans aggregated according to bank 
type. On average, retail banks spend more on collecting informa-
tion on their borrowers, relatively to the size of their credit 
balances, than either investment banks or specialized banks 
linked to the car-assembly industry. Considering only the retail 
banks, there seems to be a negative correlation between expen-
ditures and bank size, with large retail banks spending less than 
either the medium or the small sized banks. Although within 
group standard deviations are high and sample sizes small, so 
that group averages are not statistically different, the data sug-
gests that the latter is the group of banks with the largest 
expenditures per total credit outstanding in the sample: on 
average, they spend three to four times more than the large retail 
banks for external information to screen borrowers. Moreover, 
note that within group coefficients of variation are lower than for 
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Table A.3 
Monthly expenditures per R$ 1,000.00 of credit by groups 
of banks (in reais) 
Groups of banks 1998(1) 1998(2) 1999(1) 
Car-industry banks 
Average 0.136 0.106 0.080 
Standard-deviation 0.105 0.034 0.032 
Number 5 5 4 
Investment banks 
Average 0.101 0.054 0.240 
Standard-deviation 0.265 0.090 0.666 
Number 12 12 9 
Large retail 
Average 0.475 0.447 0.418 
Standard-deviation 0.491 0.424 0.412 
Number 7 7 7 
Medium retail 
Average 1.38 1.30 1.154 
Standard-deviation 1.23 0.87 0.826 
Number 13 13 11 
Small retail 
Average 1.47 1.97 1.37 
Standard-deviation 1.34 1.94 1.85 
Number 9 9 9 
Total 
Average 0.82 0.82 0.76 
Standard-deviation 1.07 1.21 1.12 
Number 46 46 40 
Source: Based on data provided by Serasa. 
the complete sample, with the exception of investment banks, 
suggesting that bank type is in fact a relevant explanation for 
cross-bank differences in expenditures with outside credit infor-
mation. 
The fact that small retail banks spend more, relatively to 
credit balances, on buying CIR information than other types of 
retail banks may be due to three factors: firstly, this type of 
externally-generated data may be the only informational input 
used by small banks to decide whether to grant credit, since their 
size might not justify incurring the costs of having a "proprietary" 
system of collecting and analyzing data on their customers, unlike 
the medium and large retail banks which maintain such facilities, 
as mentioned earlier. Secondly, no matter how small, there is 
always a fixed cost component of assessing CIR information, 
which leads to a negative relation between loan size and costs of 
paying for external data. Therefore, there seems to be economies 
of scale not only in the information gathering process, but also in 
its utilization by banks. Finally, in pricing its products and 
services to banks, Serasa gives quantity discounts. Hence, the 
price of each additional unit of external data bought by any bank 
decreases as it buys more information from Serasa. 
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Annex B 
Empirical Distribution of Loan Values 
In Sections 2 and 3 we assumed that loan values (I) were 
distributed exponentially, essentially out of easy of mathematical 
manipulation. Data from the CRC, which became available to us 
afterwards, show that at least for loans above R$ 20,000, the 
exponential distribution is indeed a good approximation for loans 
to individuals, but that it does not provide a good fit for the 
empirical distribution of loans to firms. The main problem in this 
case resides in the low probability ascribed by the exponential 
distribution for small loans, comparatively to what is observed 
empirically. Or, looking from the other side, the empirical dis-
tribution of loans to firms is much more positively skewed than 
the exponential distribution with the same mean. Although we do 
not have the necessary data to test this hypothesis, we believe 
that the exponential distribution may provide a good fit for loans 
to firms if we truncate the empirical distribution from above. 
In Figures 1 and 2 we present for individuals and firms the 
empirical, exponential, uniform, Weibull and lognormal cumula-
tive distribution functions of loan values - in the last four cases 
imposing the value of the distribution mean to be R$ 58,878 and 
R$ 907,489, for individuals and firms respectively. In both cases 
the horizontal axis is in logarithmic scale (1n(0). The best fit, as 
measured by a MSE statistic calculated for the 13 values for which 
we had information on the empirical distribution, is the exponen-
tial distribution in the case of individuals and the lognormal in 
the case of firms. 
Figure 1 
Empirical, Exponential and Other Distributions of Loan 
Values for Individuals 
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Empirical, Exponential and Other Distributions for Loan 
Values Extended to Firms 
Annex C 
The Retail and Middle Markets with the Use of the 
Screening Technology 
With the use of the screening technology, the volume of 
credit, number of loan applicants and of borrowers, safe and 
risky, respectively, in the retail market are given by: 
Volume of credit 
114 	V 	- 
VC1 = Npa(z) du /V 1 — e -I ht dl= 
_Rr+cr Aqs1) 
= Npa(211 	RT)  d exp (Lls , Lm ) --L -C A expg , Lm  
)1 V 	 Vq s 
with 
d exp(x,y) = (x + X) exp(- x/X) - (y + X) exp(- y/X) 
Aexp(x,y) = exp(- x/X) - exp(- y/A,) 
and 
VC 71 = Np(1- a(Z)) f 
If 
RT  V 





+ A) v Vq Ftr +c, 	 s_ 
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Number of loan applicants 
LM 
N2q, =Np$  
L 
e —I / f dv /V — dl= 
RT +CT AC 1 sl) 
  
Np{
(V - RT) 
ex (LS  , Lm ) 
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CT fL. e--112 
V 	 q s J.L1  
NA TR -
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di= = N(1- p) 	dv /V 
RT +CT Aq r1) 
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Vq, JR 12 
with NA T. = NAT + NAIT! 
Number of borrowers 
NE4 = a(z)NAT 
Ng; = p(1 - a(z))N4 /(1 - p) 
with /VBT = NE4+ NE4 
In the middle market, in turn, the volume of credit is 
given by 
VC m = Np{f 	dv /V —1 / A d1}+ Np(1- a(z)){ .1 	f dv /V 
L K LR, +Cm /q,1 1.4 _R m +C, /(4,1 
Lc r V 	 Lc. 	V 
Np
r v R m  
	d exp(2, Lm , Lc) CM A(Lm , Lc) I  + 
V 9S 
+ Np(1- a(z))(V
Rm 	LIR L 	Cm *IL , )] v.  Id expyl, m C \Vs ' 
} —1 e -I Rd/ = 
A 
where the first term in the expression above accounts for borrow-
ers who originally looked for loans in this market segment and 
the second for safe borrowers wrongly classified as risky in the 
retail market. Competition in the retail market ensures that 
banks make no profit in this market segment, so that: 
RT = (1 + R)/qT - 1, where 
qT = (qsVCsr + qrVd;)/(VC:7, + VC17). 
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